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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This report presents results from the second stage of a research 
project, funded by the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund, which aims to 
assess the impact of recent changes in central government 
policies and powers in relation to local government finance upon 
local authoritiesf transport expenditure and outputs and upon 
their approach to addressing local transport problems and needs. 
A previous Working Paper (Sanderson, 1988) reviews relevant 
changes in government policies and financial control mechanisms 
and identifies major research issues. The results presented in 
the present report derive from an analysis of data on trends in 
local authoritiesf transport expenditure relative to Government's 
spending plans and expenditure provisions over the period since 
1979/80 which attempts to identify the impact of changes in 
government policies and controls. Conclusions from this analysis 
will provide the basis for a more detailed examination of 
information relating to a small sample of local authorities from 
which a better understanding of cause-effect relationships will 
be obtained. The results from this latter stage of the research 
will be published in a third working paper. 
1.2 Research Focus 
As indicated in our previous report (Sanderson, 1988, p 49-51) 
the central focus of our research is on the change in the 
Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) system announced in 1984 
which restricted TSG support from 1985/86 to capital expenditure 
in respect of road schemes 'of more than local importancef, 
specifically In.. investment on roads which form part of the 
primary route network of major through routes, important urban 
roads, and bypasses and relief roads which relieve communities of 
the effects of heavy through trafficww (Department of Transport, 
1984, para 2). However, it is considered that this change should 
be examined in the context of a wide range of measures introduced 
by the Conservative Government since 1979 affecting local 
government finance in general, and the financing of local 
transport expenditure in particular. A consistent theme, with 
both economic and political dimensions, can be seen as running 
through these changes from the Local Government Planning and Land 
Act 1980, through the Local Government Finance Act 1982, the 
Rates Act 1984, the Transport Acts of 1983 and 1985, the Local 
Government Act 1985, and culminating in the Government's present 
proposals for the abolition of domestic rates and reform of the 
grants system, already on the Statute Book in respect of 
Scotland. These legislative measures can be seen as representing 
concrete manifestations of the Government's broader economic and 
political programme for Britain in which the objectives of 
reducing the role of the public sector and, conversely, providing 
the conditions for a flourishing and profitable private sector, 
produce major implications for local government, its role, 
responsibilities and financing (cf. Sanderson, 1988). 
The specific measures which.have been introduced since the early 
1980s affecting the scale and pattern of local authority 
expenditure can be summarised as follows (see Sanderson op cit 
for a full discussion): 
the introduction of the block grant system in 1981/82, 
following the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, 
with grant distribution based upon the new GRE methodology; 
deriving from the same legislation, and also introduced in 
1981/82, a new system of control over capital expenditure 
which replaced 'loan sanctions' with expenditure allocations 
for service blocks, thus shifting the focus of control from 
borrowing to actual spending; 
the super-imposition on the basic block grant system of 
expenditure targets and grant penalties, which operated with 
increasing severity up to 1985/86, being replaced in 1986/87 
by a modification to the 'grant-related poundage* schedule 
in the basic block grant formula; 
the introduction of the 'selective rate limitation scheme' 
('rate-capping') in 1985/86, following the Rates Act 1984, 
which provided for direct control by the Secretary of State 
of the expenditure levels of those authorities whose 
expenditure is considered to be 'excessive and 
unreasonablef; 
following the successful legal challenge by Bromley Council 
to the GLC's 'Fares Fair' policy and the consequent 1983 
Transport Act, the designation by the Secretary of State of 
Protected Expenditure Levels' (PELs) relating to public 
transport revenue support in the metropolitan areas; 
the transfer, in June 1984, of responsibility for public 
transport in London from the GLC to London Regional 
Transport, a nationalised industry whose financing is under 
the direct control of the Secretary of State; 
the reform of the Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) system 
from 1985/86 so as to terminate supplementary support for 
local transport current expenditure and restrict TSG to 
'highways capital expenditure which is of more than local 
importance'; 
the abolition, in March 1986, of the GLC and the 
Metropolitan County Councils and the transfer of 
responsibility for public transport in the Metropolitan 
Counties to 'joint board' PTAs whose expenditure for the 
first three years of their existence is subject to direct 
control by the Secretary of State via the designation of 
Expenditure Levelsf (ELs) and precept limits ; 
the deregulation of local bus transport from October 1986, 
producing a requirement for local authorities to subject to 
competitive tender the 'supported services' which they wish 
to secure over and above the 'commercial services' provided 
by private bus operators; 
recent changes to the capital control system which, from 
1987/88, incorporate assumptions about the use of local 
authorities1 accumulated capital receipts in the designation 
by the Government of capital allocations and 'their 
relationship to provision. 
Taken together with the Governmentls present proposals to replace 
domestic rates with a per capita 'community charge1, to introduce 
central control over the level and distribution of non-domestic 
rates, and to replace the present block grant with a 'needs 
grantf supplemented by a per capita 'standard grant1, the 
measures introduced since 1980 can be seen as effecting a 
significant increase in the degree of central control over local 
government expenditure. In terms of assessing the implications 
of these changes for local transport expenditure and provision we 
are clearly presented with an extremely complex task due to the 
coincidence and interaction of the effects of a number of 
different measures. 
As indicated above, our research focusses, in particular, upon 
the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86 and it is obvious that 
this was introduced into a complex and changing context of 
measures with expenditure consequences. Thus, for example, when 
looking at the impact of the loss of TSG support for transport 
current expenditure and the full incorporation of such 
expenditure within the block grant system in 1985/86, the 
operation of the system of expenditure targets and penalties and 
the first year of the rate-capping system have to be examined; 
revenue support for public transport in London had ceased to be a 
local authority responsibility. The picture is complicated the 
following year by the ending of specific targets and penalties 
and by the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan county councils, 
with highways current expenditure transferring to the boroughs 
and districts but public transport current expenditure in the 
metropolitan counties becoming the responsibility of the PTAs. 
From October 1986 expenditure on public transport in all areas 
was affected by bus deregulation. The capital expenditure 
picture is similarly complicated, additionally by the inclusion 
in transport capital provision from 1987/88 of an assumed 
proportion of local authorities1 capital receipts accumulated 
from previous years under the ,cascadingf system. 
1.3 Structure of Report 
In this report the analysis is divided into two main parts. 
First (in Section 2), we examine trends in local transport 
expenditure and provision up to 1984/85 in order to provide an 
understanding of the context in which the Government decided to 
reform the TSG system. Second, (in Section 3) we look at trends 
since 1984/85 in order to derive an assessment of the way in 
which the reformed TSG system has operated in the context of the 
wider expenditure control systems. In conclusion (Section 4) we 
draw together the main findings and identify specific issues on 
which the next stage of our research will focus. 
2. Trends in Local Transvrt Exvenditure to 1984/85 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section we examine trends in transport expenditure by 
local authorities over the period 1979/80 to 1984/85 compared 
with trends in provision for such expenditure made by the 
Government in the context of the annual public expenditure 
planning system and published each year in the Public Expenditure 
White Paper. In addition, the Government's plans for local 
transport expenditure are reflected in the annual TSG settlement, 
which provides authorities with TSG on the basis of 'accepted 
expenditures', which also reflect the Government's expenditure 
plans. In general terms, when we use the term 'provision1 we 
refer to the Government's plans as published in the Public 
Expenditure White Paper. The purpose of analysing trends up to 
1984/85 is to provide an understanding of the context in which 
the reform of the TSG system took place, discontinuing 
supplementary grant support for current expenditure on road 
maintenance, safety and public transport revenue support and 
restricting it to capital expenditure on road schemes of more 
than local importance. In particular, we aim to derive an 
assessment of the role of TSG in explaining trends up to 1984/85 
relative to the role of the broader systems for controlling local 
authorities1 current and capital expenditure. 
The first part of this section looks at trends in local 
authoritiesf current expenditure relative to the Government's 
provision up to 1984/85 in terms of two sub-periods (first, 
1979/80 to 1982/83 and, second, 1982/83 to 1984/85) with a 
specific examination of the role of the block grant system, 
expenditure targets and grant penalties. Trends in capital 
expenditure are then analysed with particular focus on the 
capital expenditure control system. Finally, an attempt is made 
to assess the role of TSG in explaining the trends in the context 
of the broader expenditure control systems. 
2.2 Current Exvenditure 
2.2.1 Trends Between 1979/80 and 1982/83 
The trend in English local authorities1 current transport 
expenditure since 1979/80 relative to the Government's planned 
provision is shown in Figures 2.1 - 2.3. Two distinct periods 
are evident in the trends to 1984/85. First, during the period 
1979/80 to $982/83 total current expenditure increased by 13% in 
real terms while the Government's provision decreased by 12% 
reflecting the Government's attempts to reduce local authority 
spending in the context of broader measures to control public 
expenditure generally (Sanderson, 1988, p 9-11). Consequently, 
whereas there had been a slight underspend in 1979/80 (3.5%)' by 
1982/83 local authorities' transport expenditure was some 23% in 
................................................................. 
l Throughout this report 'real terms' expenditure data is 
derived using the GDP market price deflator except for road 
maintenance current expenditure for which a separate index 
is available : see ~iiiiex. 
excess of provision. Most of the increase in expenditure up to 
1982/83 was accounted for by support for public transport, 'which 
increased by 60%, and by concessionary fares (a 24% increase). 
On the other hand, the Government's spending plans provided for a 
decrease in such expenditure so that by 1982/83 spending on 
public transport revenue support was 63% in excess of provision, 
while the overspend on concessionary fares was 24%. Over this 
same period expenditure on road maintenance remained relatively 
constant in real terms while provision was decreased by some 7%, 
producing a 5.7% overspend in 1982/83. Administration 
(professional and technical services) was also substantially (c. 
28%) overspent by 1982/83 in spite of a real terms reduction in 
spending of 14%, which failed to match the reduction in provision 
of 35%. 
Therefore, it is apparent that between 1979/80 and 1982/83 the 
Government's efforts to control local authoritiesf current 
expenditure by decreasing provision (and Rate Support Grant) did 
not meet with success. Expenditure on public transport revenue 
support was responsible for much of the 'overspend problem' and, 
in particular, increased expenditure in London and Metropolitan 
Counties - up by 82% between 1979/80 and 1982/83 (see Figure 
2.4). 
The pattern of revenue support expenditure over this period is 
shown in more detail in Figures 2.5a - 2.5e. From Figure 2.5a it 
can be seen that, nationally, there was a steady decrease in 
provision in real terms between 1979/80 and 1981/82 contrasting 
with the steady increase in expenditure: however, in 1982/83 a 
small real terms increase in provision was made by the Government 
to allow for #l... overspending in 1981-82 (which) means that 
local authorities will not be able to achieve the previously 
planned levels ...l8 (H M Treasury, 1982, p 24). Notwithstanding 
this fconcession' by the Government, expenditure increased 
substantially in real terms in 1982/83 so the overspend against 
provision in 1982/83 was 63% (compared with 44% the previous 
year). 
Figures 2.5b - 2.5e show trends in London, the Metropolitan and 
shire areas comparing outturn expenditure with TPP bids and 
expenditure accepted for TSG. It can be seen that up to 1981/82 
the 'overspend' problem (i.e. outturn expenditure relative to 
accepted expenditure) was attributable mainly to the metropolitan 
counties (MCCs) where a 59% increase in expenditure contrasted 
with a 13% decrease in the level of expenditure accepted for TSG, 
producing an 'overspend' against the latter of 94% (Figures 2.5~ 
to 2.5e) . 
It can be seen that 1981/82 was the year in which revenue support 
expenditure in the MCCs moved seriously out of line with the 
Governmentfs plans and this can be related clearly to the changes 
in political control in these authorities at the May 1981 local 
elections. Table 2.1 shows the changes in political control in 
four of the MCCs and the related substantial increases in outturn 
expenditure on revenue support over the budgets set by the pre- 
May 1981 administrations. Of course, these increases occurred at 
a time of substantial increases in unemployment and declines in 
revenue for the public transport undertakings in the metropolitan 
counties producing increased demands for subsidies to avoid fares 
increases. 
Table 2.1 
Changes in Political Control in May 1981 in the 
Metropolitan County Councils and Implications for 
Revenue Support Expenditure 1981/82 
Political Control Revenue Support 
Expenditure 
1980 1981 1981/82 
Party ~ajorit~' Party Majority1 Outturn % 
Factor Factor Original 
Budget 
Greater Manchester Con 3.08 Lab 2.79 + 32.7 
Merseyside con 2.09 Lab 1.25 + 37.2 
South yorkshire Lab 1.63 Lab 4.56 + 6.4 
Tyne and Wear Lab 1.04 Lab 2.25 - 2.0 
West Midlands con 3.16 Lab 2.47 + 84.0 
West yorkshire con 1.51 Lab 2.52 + 48.5 
Note- 'Majority Factor' = Seats of maioritv ~artv 
-* 
Total of other seats 
Source: CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 1981/82; Highways 
and Transportation Statistics 1981/82; Municipal Yearbook 
1982. 
The degree of overspend in the MCCs decreased in 1982/83 as the 
rate of growth in expenditure moderated and was more than offset 
by the increase in 'accepted expenditure1 of 16%. This latter 
increase can be related to the substantial increase in the TPP 
bid for revenue support by the MCCs in 1982/83, this being the 
first bid by the authorities following the political changes in 
May 1981. 
The bids for 1981/82 by the previous administrations had been 
reduced in line with the new Conservative Government's guidance 
for TPP preparation which had indicated that the spending 
provision in the Public Expenditure White Paper should be taken 
as the basis for authorities1 bids (Department of Transport, 
1980, para 2). Nationally, the sum of revenue support bids 
exceeded provision by only 6.6% and in the MCCs 86% of the bid 
was accepted for TSG. However, following the change in political 
control in the MCCs there was clearly less inclination to conform 
to the Governmentls guidance for 1982/83 TPP preparation (again 
exhorting authorities to conform to the PEWP provisions) in the 
face of deteriorating trends in public transport patronage and 
the 1982/83 bids from these authorities were, in total, 57% up 
from 1981/82, compared with the 7.6% real terms increase in 
provision. 
The pattern in London is rather different (Figure 2.5b and 2.5e). 
The GLC's expenditure on revenue support increased significantly 
in 1980/81 but, following the change in political control to 
Labour in May 1981, expenditure actually fell in real terms in 
1981/82. However, the effect of the cheap fares policy pursued 
by the new Labour Council is reflected in the 1982/83 outturn 
which was 81% in excess of the 'accepted expendituref for that 
year. The substantial increase in the TPP bid in respect of 
revenue support came in 1983/84 one year later than in the MCCs, 
and in contradiction to increasingly specific guidance from the 
Government in respect of TPP preparation referring to the need to 
"... contain revenue support to public transport .l1 and 
indicating the Governmentfs unwillingness to accept It.. 
proposals for subsidies intended to implement generalised low 
fares policie~.~~ (Department of Transport, 1982, paras 3,lO). 
In contrast to the large urban areas, the picture in the shire 
areas is one of underspending on revenue support, although 
between 1980/81 and 1982/83 the degree of underspend against 
,accepted expendituref decreased significantly as increasing 
actual expenditure caught up with a relatively static 'accepted 
expenditurer. As in the MCCs, a significant increase in the TPP 
bids from the shire counties occurred in 1982/83 which, again, 
can be related to the impact of the economic recession on bus 
patronage. 
As regards road maintenance (and safety), as indicated above, a 
modest overspend against provision nationally (5.7%) by 1982/83 
was primarily due to a decrease in provision, particularly in 
1981/82 (Figures 2.2 - 2.3). This trend is shown more clearly in 
Figures 2.6a - 2.6d. In 1981/82 London and the metropolitan 
areas suffered a real terms decrease in accepted expenditure of 
15% and 13% respectively; in the shire areas it was 9.3%. These 
decreases followed reduced bids in 1981/82 in line with the 
Government's guidance for TPP preparation which reflected their 
broader concern to achieve reductions in public expenditure. 
Therefore, in 1981/82 there was a sizeable overspend against 
accepted expenditure compared to an underspend the previous year. 
Provision was increased by the Government in 1982/83 (as in the 
case of revenue support) in recognition of authoritiesf inability 
to meet the previously planned level, and this reduced the degree 
of ovespending. In London and the metropolitan areas the degree 
of overspend on maintenance was much lower than for revenue 
support and the marginal increase in real terms in the MCCs 
bids for road maintenance in 1982/83 (+ 1%) contrasts markedly 
with the 57% increase in the bid for revenue support, indicating 
a greater preparedness to conform to Government policy in respect 
of road maintenance expenditure (Figures 2 . 5 ~  and 2.6~). In the 
shire areas the overspend on maintenance in 1982/83 contrasts 
with the underspend on revenue support (relative to 'accepted 
expendituref) indicating the difference in the perceived needs 
and priorities in these areas compared with the large urban 
centres. 
Therefore, the period 1979/80 to 1982/83 presents a picture of 
local authorities increasingly out of step with central 
government policies and provisions in respect of current 
expenditure. The introduction of the new block grant system and 
expenditure targets and penalties designed to effect a reduction 
in expenditure marked a significant increase in the degree of 
overspending, particular&y.in London and the metropolitan areas 
where newly-elected Labour authorities came into increasing 
conflict with the Government after 1981. In the transport field, 
public transport revenue support was the main source of conflict 
and overspending as councils in the large urban centres adopted 
'cheap faresf policies in response to declining patronage trends 
due to the economic recession. Following the legal challenge by 
Bromley Borough Council to the GLCfs cheap fares policy in 1982, 
the resulting Lordsf ruling against the GLC, and subsequent 
similar challenges to the policies of West Midlands and 
Merseyside County Councils, the Government passed the 1983 
Transport Act which established 'Protected Expenditure Levelsf 
for revenue support in the metropolitan areas (cf. Sanderson, 
1988, p 39-43). The purpose of this legislation was explicitly 
'l... to restrain expenditure on public transport revenue support 
in the metropolitan areas." (H M Treasury, 1983, p 30). This 
legislation, and the broader operation of the Government's 
control system for current expenditure (particularly, the 
increasingly severe regime of grant penalties) provides the 
context for examining trends in transport expenditure during the 
second distinctive period, from 1982/83 to 1984/85. 
2.2.2 Trends Between 1982/83 and 1984/85 
During this period the real terms increase in expenditure, which 
had taken place up to 1982/83, was effectively halted; local 
transport current expenditure remained relatively constant in 
real terms up to 1984/85, as did the level of the Government's 
total provision and, consequently, the degree of overspending, 
which varied between 23% and 26% over this period. Therefore, 
the period is one of continuing substantial disjunction between 
the Government's policies and provisions and local authoritiesf 
behaviour (Figs 2.1 - 2.3). 
However, the trends in respect of the two major current 
expenditure programmes over this period (i.e. revenue support and 
road maintenance) show significant differences. As regards 
public transport support (Figure 2.5a), expenditure increased 
only slightly in real terms, a marked reduction in the rate of 
increase from previous years. The Government's provision was 
decreased in 1983/84 by 10% in real terms reflecting the concern 
to achieve a reduction in expenditure: as a result the degree of 
overspend increased in 1983/84 to 82%. This level of 
overspending against provision was sustained in 1984/85 as a 
small real terms increase in provision matched the increase in 
expenditure (cf. Figure 2.3). 
It is notable that the Governmentfs provision for revenue support 
actually increased in 1984/85 at a time when it was concerned to 
effect a substantial reduction in expenditure. Figure 2.5a also 
shows that there was a significant increase in the level of 
expenditure accepted for TSG in 1983/84. There are two relevant 
factors here. First, it can be seen that TPP bids for revenue 
support increased substantially in 1983/84, primarily due to a 
148% increase in the GLC bid (Figure 2.5b). The GLC achieved a 
22% real increase in its revenue support 'accepted expenditure' 
in 1983/84 in spite of the Governmentfs view that its expenditure 
was far in excess of desirable levels. However, perhaps of more 
relevance was the introduction, in 1983/84, of Protected 
Expenditure Levels (PELs)-for revenue support in London and the 
metropolitan areas following the 1983 Transport Act which were 
significantly in excess of specific provision for these areas. 
The Government's view of the relationship between the PELS, the 
level of provision in spending plans, and accepted expenditure 
for TSG was stated as follows: 
~lLegislation has now been introduced to restrain expenditure 
on public transport revenue support in the metropolitan 
areas. But past failure to tailor services to demand, 
inefficiency in operation and in some cases too low fares 
means that it will not be practicable to bring revenue 
support to the Passenger Transport Executives and London 
Transport in line with the Governmentts plans immediately. 
The levels of expenditure which it is proposed to protect 
from legal challenge under the new legislation will reflect 
the difficulties of adjusting rapidly to more balanced 
policies and may therefore exceed the specific provision for 
1983-84 by about £135 million .... The Government is not, 
however, prepared to grant-aid the protected expenditure 
levels in full, and the revenue support expenditure for the 
metropolitan areas accepted for Transport Supplementary 
Grant will be less than the total of the provisional 
protected expenditure levels under the legislation." 
(H M Treasury, 1983, p 30) 
However, in view of the fact that In.. PELs are not intended as 
guidelines but maxima ..lt (H M Treasury, 1984, p 45) it is 
difficult to see the Government's logic in providing TSG support 
for levels of expenditure on revenue support in excess of the 
provision made in the spending plans when it is this provision 
which represented the Government's view of the desirable level of 
expenditure. Thus, in 1983/84 expenditure accepted for TSG 
support exceeded provision by 26%, although this excess was 
reduced to 12% in 1984/85. As indicated earlier, the GLC would 
appear to have been the main beneficiary in terms of increased 
accepted expenditure (Figure 2.5b) and through an increase in TSG 
of 7% (compared with a national decrease of 5%). Thus, in 
1983/84 the proportion of total TSG allocated to London and the 
metropolitan areas was 71% compared to 65.6% in 1982/83. It 
would appear that this could have helped to sustain high levels 
of spending on revenue support since in 1983/84, there was only a 
small overspend on road maintenance and an underspend on roads 
capital expenditure (see Section 2.4). 
In 1984/85 provision for revenue support was increased slightly 
in real terms (+ 1.4%) whereas PELs and accepted expenditure 
decreased, the latter being particularly marked in London and the 
metropolitan areas (- 14%). which also, therefore, suffered a 
significant loss of TSG (- 26%). (This is also related to a 
decrease in capital accepted expenditure in London. ) 
Nevertheless, expenditure on revenue support in London increased 
in real terms in 1984/85 by 5% while in the metropolitan counties 
it remained at the same level as in 1983/84. These trends do not 
provide strong support for the Governmentts claim for the success 
of PELs in restraining revenue support expenditure in the 
metropolitan areas. Although the Government cites the evidence 
of a substantial reduction in budgets in the metropolitan areas 
from original plans, and the rate of real increase in expenditure 
did level off after 1982/83 (with a subsequent slight reduction 
in the metropolitan counties) there remains a substantial 
question mark over the effectiveness of PELs. In particular, 
they would appear to have contributed to a higher degree of TSG 
support being given to the GLC and NCCs than may otherwise have 
been the case at a time when these authorities were overspending 
substantially on revenue support (this will be discussed further 
in Section 2.4 below). 
The trend in road maintenance expenditure relative to provision 
over the period 1982/83 to 1984/85 presents a somewhat different 
picture. Nationally, a modest overspend in 1982/83 had been 
virtually eliminated by 1984/85 as expenditure declined by some 
3% in real terms while provision increased by a similar 
proportion (Figures 2.1 - 2.3). The disrepancies between 
expenditure and the Government's plans over this period were 
substantially less than in the case of revenue support. Figure 
2.2 indicates that a significant increase in provisio y was made 
in 1982/83 for road maintenance (+ 4.5% in real terms ) ,  as it 
was for revenue support, In... because overspending in 1981-82 
means that local authorities will not be able to achieve the 
previously planned levels ..l1 (H M Treasury, 1982, p 24). 
The degree of overspend in 1982/83 (6%) was therefore reduced 
from the previous year. Figures 2.6a - 2.6d indicate that most 
of the overspend relative to expenditure accepted for TSG (which 
is roughly equivalent to provision) was accounted for by the 
shire areas but the largest proportional overspend (14%) was in 
London. 
In setting the provision for the next two years, the Government's 
main concern was to reduce ovespending. For example, in the 1983 
Public Expenditure White Paper it is argued that: 
I1Responsible pay settlements, increased efficiency and the 
avoidance of waste should enable local government to 
maintain satisfactory levels of road maintenance and other 
services which they themselves provide without having to 
overspend the provision.I1 
(H M Treasury, 1983, p 30) 
In 1983/84 national provision was increased marginally in real 
terms but the GLC and the metropolitan counties suffered a 
decrease in 'accepted expendituret while the shire counties 
received a slight increase (Figures 2.6a - 2.6d). This contrasts 
interestingly with the picture for revenue support (above p. 9) 
where the GLC and the metropolitan counties received a 
significant increase in accepted expenditure in 1983/84, 
resulting in an increase in their share of TSG. It is rather 
difficult to see how this situation fits in with the Government's 
objectives: London and the metropolitan areas benefitted in 
terms of TSG support in respect of revenue support expenditure 
siqnificantly at odds with the Governmentrs policies and lost 
l Road maintenance and lighting cost figures have been 
transformed to consxant prices using the maintenance and 
lighting prices indices outlined in Annex. 
(marginally) in respect of road maintenance expenditure whi.ch was 
only slightly in excess of the Government's provision; on the 
other hand, the shire areas suffered a decrease in TSG support in 
spite of an increase in accepted expenditure for both revenue 
support and maintenance and in spite of being much closer to the 
Government's plans in their expenditure behaviour. 
Therefore, in 1983/84 expenditure on road maintenance in London 
and the metropolitan areas actually increased in real terms 
taking them further out of line with the Government's plans while 
in the shire areas expenditure decreased (in spite of the 
increase in accepted expenditure) bringing them broadly into line 
with the Government's plans. However, the real terms decline in 
expenditure in the shire areas continued into 1984/85 and, 
because accepted expenditure was increased slightly, resulted in 
an underspend, notwithstanding an increase in TSG support. A 
decline in expenditure in the metropolitan areas also produced an 
underspend against 'accepted expenditure1. In contrast 
expenditure continued to increase in real terms in London in 
1984/85 increasing the overspend against ,accepted expendituref 
to 38% (Figures 2.6b - 2.6d) . 
Therefore, over the period 1982/83 to 1984/85, although 
nationally the total of transport current expenditure remained 
relatively constant in real terms, there were changes in its 
composition and distribution between local authority classes. 
Taking revenue support and road maintenance expenditure (over 
three quarters of the total during this period) two main trends 
are in evidence. First, revenue support expenditure increased 
its share of the total from 37.8% to 39.4% which contrasts with 
its share of provision which fell from 29.4% to 27%. Second, 
expenditure on both maintenance and revenue support increased in 
London by some 15% and decreased in both the metropolitan areas 
(- 4%) and the shire areas (- 6%). This contrasts with the trend 
in accepted expenditure which decreased in London by 5%, remained 
relatively constant in the metropolitan areas and increased by 
about 6% in the shire areas. Therefore, over this period it is 
clearly London which is mostly out of line with Government 
policies for current expenditure, being 75% overspent against 
accepted expenditure by 1984/85, mainly due to revenue support. 
Despite reducing their current expenditure in real terms, the 
metropolitan areas were still 28% overspent against accepted 
expenditure in 1984/85, wholly due to revenue support. In 
contrast the shire areas were experiencing a problem of being 
increasingly underspent against accepted expenditure (7% in 
1984/85) as spending declined in real terns in spite of an 
increase in accepted expenditure. 
As indicated earlier it is necessary to refer to the operation of 
both the TSG system and the wider block grant system (with the 
additional system of targets and penalties) in attempting to 
explain these trends in current expenditure. Since TSG covered 
both current and capital expenditure over this period it will be 
appropriate to leave its consideration until after the analysis 
of trends in capital expenditure. In the next section we shall 
look briefly at the impact of the block grant system, targets and 
penalties. 
.- 
2.2.3 Block Grant. Taraets and Penalties 
Since the introduction of the block grant system in 1981/82 the 
Governmentls attempts to restrain local authoritiesf expenditure 
have resulted in a declining contribution of Aggregate Exchequer 
Grant to total relevant expenditure. Figure 2.7 shows this 
declining contribution, down from 59% in 1981/82 to 50% in 
1984/85. Moreover, the decline in the contribution of block 
grant to total expenditure was even more marked over the same 
period (45% down to 35%) as the amount of AEG earmarked for 
specific and supplementary grants increased (by 30%). 
This decline in the level of support provided by central 
government to local authority expenditure placed authorities 
under increasing pressure to restrain expenditure given that 
their only alternative was to increase their rate poundages. The 
trend shown in Figure 2.7 is accounted for by two main factors. 
First, the original determination of AEG and block grant each 
year by the Secretary of State for the Environment, and published 
in the Rate Support Grant Main Reports, declined over the period 
to 1984/85; thus, block grant provision was reduced by some 12%. 
Second, up to 1985/86 authorities whose expenditure exceeded 
their targets suffered grant penalties but the block grant 
withheld from these authorities was not re-cycled under the 
'close-ending1 arrangements resulting in a reduction in the total 
block grant paid. Thus, the reduction in the 1983/84 block grant 
between the original determination (in 1982) and the latest 
Supplementary Rate Support Grant Report1 (1988) is 4%; the 
equivalent figure in respect of 1984/85 is 2%. 
The prospect of block grant abatement due to the operation of the 
system of targets and penalties was an important factor in local 
authorities1 spending decisions over the period 1982/83 to 
1984/85 and, as indicated in the previous section, is a relevant 
consideration in explaining trends in local transport current 
expenditure. During this period grant penalties became 
increasi gly severe on authorities overspending their expenditure 
targets.' For example, an authority spending 6% over target in 
1982/83 suffered a loss of grant equivalent to 15 pence in the 
pound at ratepayer level; by 1984/85 the penalty for the same 
degree of overspending had increased to 41p. 
Targets did not bear a simple relationship to grant-related 
expenditures (GREs). Whereas the latter represents a level of 
expenditure which the Government considers is lobjectively' 
required for an authority to provide an 'appropriate1 level of 
service, targets expressed a more pragmatic view of what 
authorities could realistically achieve in the light of their 
past spending behaviour. Therefore, the main criteria in setting 
targets in any one year tended to be specified relationships 
either to previous years1 budgets or to the previous year1s 
target (Smith and Stewart, 1985). Overall, targets were related 
to the Government's provision for total local authority 
expenditure, differing from GREs primarily in respect of a 
proportion of the provision not allocated to services and, 
therefore, not appearing in GREs. 
................................................................. 
l The system is explained in more detail in Sanderson (1988, p 
14-15) 
The discrepancy between targets and GREs, and the fact that the 
system of targets and penalties 'cut across' the logic of the 
basic block grant system, constituted a basis for considerable 
criticism (for example, from the Audit Commission, 1984) which 
eventually led to their abandonment by the Government in the 
financial year 1986/87. In 1982/83, in fact, any authority with 
an initial target below its GRE was allowed to use the latter as 
its effective target and this protected from penalty several low- 
spending authorities. However, in 1983/84 this 'GRE exemption1 
was discontinued and as Smith and Stewart commented (op cit, 
p. 26-7): 
"This brought loud protest from low-spending, predominantly 
Conservative-controlled councils, many of which would now be 
penalised for spending above target, even though they were 
spending below GRE, the Governmentls own assessment of their 
standard level of expenditure." 
In 1984/85 the system was made markedly more severe both in terms 
of the relationship of the targets set to the previous year1s 
targets and budgets and in terms of the grant penalties imposed 
(ibid. p 27-8). 
It is possible to make a general assessment at this stage of the 
impact of targets and penalties on transport current expenditure 
in the different local authority classes between 1982/83 and 
1984/85. Figure 2.8 shows the relationships between targets and 
total GREs for the GLC, the metropolitan counties and the shire 
counties. It can be seen that in 1982/83 the metropolitan were 
given targets significantly in excess of GRE while in the GLC and 
shire counties the 'GRE exemption1 applied on the whole with 
targets equal to GREs. However, in 1983/84 while the GLC and the 
metropolitan counties received an increase in their targets in 
excess of the increase in their GREs, the shire counties 
collectively found their targets to be below GRE due to the 
ending of the 'GRE exemptionp. For many shire counties the 
targets in 1983/84 represented a 4% increase on 1982/83 budgets, 
where those budgets had been within 1% of target, and several 
authorities now found these targets to be below their GREs. On 
the other hand, the high spending metropolitan authorities were 
allowed targets 1% below their 1982/83 budgets, whatever the 
relationship of those to the targets, resulting in a real terms 
increase in their targets of 7% (compared to a decrease for the 
shire counties of 1.3%) (Smith and Stewart, 1985). 
The substantial increase in targets for the GLC and metropolitan 
authorities in 1983/84 (which reduced the incidence of penalties 
for a given level of spending) can be seen as a factor serving to 
sustain the continued high level of overspending, particularly on 
public transport revenue support, in these authorities. 
Moreover, it may have served to reinforce the effect of an 
increase in TSG to the GLC in that year which in turn may have 
been a factor in promoting real terms growth in revenue support 
in excess of the Government's spending plans. Conversely, the 
real terms reduction in targets for the shire counties and the 
prospects of penalties on expenditure below GRE for many of these 
authorities is likely to have been a factor in the reduction of 
transport current expenditure, particularly on -highway 
maintenance, in a context where such authorities faced a 
reduction in TSG support and pressing needs across a range of 
services (e.g. education, social services, police and fire). It 
is noteworthy, therefore, that whereas current expenditure on 
revenue support and maintenance declined by 4% in real terms 
between 1982/83 and 1983/84 in the shire counties, spending on 
social services increased by 2.7%, police by 4.5%, fire services 
by 2%, while education spending decreased by less than 1%. The 
average for all services was a 0.1% decrease (Department of 
Environment 1983-1988). 
As indicated above the target and penalty regime was made more 
severe in 1984/85 with all authorities experiencing a real terms 
decrease in their targets. The GLC8s target was reduced by 5% in 
real terms, the MCCs by nearly 3% and the shire counties by some 
2% (Figure 2.8). Nevertheless, the targets still allowed the GM: 
and MCCs to spend well in excess of GRE before incurring 
penalties while for the shire counties, the collective target was 
now 3% below GRE (CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 1983/84 
and 1984/85). There is little evidence of a moderating influence 
on the GLC which budgeted to spend 67% in excess of target in 
1984/85 (compared with 53% in 1983/84) and we have seen that 
current expenditure on revenue support and highway maintenance 
continued to increase in spite of a reduction in TSG. The 
metropolitan counties do display some evidence of a moderating 
impact with the excess of budgeted expenditure over target down 
from 6.2% in 1983/84 to 5% in 1984/85 and the excess over GFtE 
down from 27% to 18% (CIPFA Finance and General Statistics op 
cit). We have also seen that current expenditure on revenue 
support and maintenance continued to decrease in real terms in 
1984/85 in the MCCs. 
As regards the shire counties expenditure on road maintenance and 
revenue support continued to decline in real terms in 1984/85 
notwithstanding the relatively favourable treatment of these 
authorities in that year's TSG settlement. This trend would 
appear to be amenable to explanation more in terms of the block 
grant and penalty system than the TSG system because of the 
relatively low proportion of total accepted expenditure in the 
shires supported by TSG up to 1984/85 (see below Section 2.4). 
In fact it would appear that the more stringent target and 
penalty system operative in 1984/85 more than offset a more 
generous TSG settlement. Because their collective target was 
reduced in real terms to 3% below GFtE, the shire counties faced 
harsher penalties for a lower 'overspend8 in relation to target. 
Thus, although the excess of their budgets over target was 
reduced from 1.6% in 1983/84 to 1.4% in 1984/85 the estimated 
penalty on these budgets increased by some 80% in real terms, and 
some shire authorities faced significant penalties even though 
their budgets were below GRE. For example, Staffordshire 
budgeted to spend 0.6% less than their GRE but faced an estimated 
penalty of some 7% of their 'pre-abatement' block grant 
entitlement (CIPFA Finance and General Statistics op cit). As in 
1983/84, outturn expenditures indicate that revenue support and 
road maintenance received rather lower priority than other major 
services. Thus, the reduction of some 2% in real terms in 
revenue support and maintenance compares with the average for all 
services of about 1%: increases were registered for police (+ 
19%), fire (+ 2%) and social services (+ 2%) while education 
spending was reduced by only 0.7%. 
Therefore, it would appear that current expenditure restraints 
through the block grant system and targets and penalties were an 
important factor between 1982/83 and 1984/85, particularly in the 
shire counties which experienced the harshest targets relative to 
GRE. Of course, authorities were free to determine their own 
priorities within constrained budgets so the fact that transport 
current expenditure decreased in the shire counties in real terms 
more than other services (and while expenditure on some other 
services decreased) is not attributable directly to the system of 
expenditure restraints but rather upon authorities' reactions to 
it. The problem was one of the priority accorded to local 
transport expenditure relative to expenditure on other services 
such as education, social services, poliae and fire. The lower 
proportion of transport expenditure in the shire counties 
supported by TSG than in-the GLC and MCCs meant that the 
influence of targets and penalties would have been felt more by 
the shire authorities and changes in TSG support would have less 
influence on expenditure behaviour. However, before looking more 
specifically at the role of TSG we will examine trends in capital 
expenditure and provision up to 1984/85. 
The trend in English local authorities transport capital 
expenditure relative to the Government's planned provision 
between 1981/82 and 1984/85 is shown in Figures 2.9a - 2.9~. The 
level of spending in 1981/82 in fact represents a significant 
reduction from 1980/81 - 14% in real terms for local transport as 
a whole - associated with the introduction of the new capital 
expenditure control system. 
The relative reduction of highways and public transport capital 
expenditure in 1981/82 is illustrated in Figures 2.11a - 2.11f. 
In England as a whole (Figure 2.11a) highways expenditure was 
reduced by some 13% in real terms and public transport 
expenditure by 10%. However, as Figure 2.11~ shows, the 
reduction in public transport spending was concentrated in the 
metropolitan counties where the main programmes were the 
construction of the Tyne and Wear Metro and investment in PTE bus 
systems. The reduction in highways-related capital investment 
was concentrated in the shire areas (Figures 2.11d and 2.11f). 
Therefore, in 1981/82 local authorities underspend the 
Government's provision for transport capital expenditure by a 
significant margin (c. 11%), with both the roads and public 
transport components below provision (Figure 2.9~). However, 
despite being underspent against provision, total transport 
capital expenditure was close to the total allocation, which was 
set some 12% below provision to allow for an assumed use of 
capital receipts (principally from the disposal of land and 
assets) to supplement the allocation (Figure 2.10) . This 
indicates that local authorities were not able to apply capital 
receipts to transport expenditure to the extent assumed by the 
Government. This contrasts with the picture in respect of, for 
example, education and environmental services (such as leisure 
and recreation ) which were overspent against provision 
indicating a priority on--the part of local authorities to apply 
capital receipts to expenditure on these services. 
Between 1981/82 and 1984/85 transport capital expenditure 
increased steadily in real terms although at a diminishing rate, 
(as Figures 2.9a and 2.11a show), the total increase over the 
period being some 17%. On the other hand, provision for 
transport actually decreased in real terms by 2% so by 1984/85 
the previous underspending had been transformed into a 6% 
overspend against total provision (Figure 2.9~). However, the 
overspend was attributable to public transport (18% above 
provision) and car parks (345% in excess of provision), 
expenditure on these programmes having increased in real terms in 
spite of reductions in provision by the Government. This 
contrasts with the roads capital programme which was subject to 
persistent underspending up to 1984/85 as the increase in 
expenditure failed to match the increase in provision (Figures 
2.9a - 2.9~). 
Looking in more detail at public transport, Figures 2.11a to 
2.11d show that the picture was dominated over the period up to 
1984/85 by London (GLC) which accounted for 80% of total national 
capital expenditure by local authorities on public transport in 
1984/85, most of the remainder being accounted for by the 
metropolitan counties (Figures 2.11b and 2.11~). It is clear 
that the GLC and metropolitan counties assigned a higher degree 
of priority to investment in their public transport systems, 
particularly in 1983/84 and 1984/85, than was accorded by the 
Government, producing the overspending shown in Figure 2.9~. The 
large real terms increase in expenditure in London in 1983/84 is 
of interest (Figure 2.11b) since in that year the GLC experienced 
a relatively favourable TSG settlement, indicating that some 
priority may have been given to TSG-supported public transport 
schemes (this is discussed further in the next section). 
As regards local authoritiesf roads capital programmes, 
underspending by local authorities during the period to 1984/85 
was a source of concern to the Government. Indeed, together with 
the contrasting overspending on current expenditure (particularly 
revenue support, as discussed in Section 2.2 above), it was a 
major factor in the Government's reasoning behind the reform of 
the TSG system, restricting support from 1985/86 to capital 
expenditure on roads 'of more than local importancef (see next 
section). The degree of underspending in 1983/84 and 1984/85 (7% 
and 6% respectively) was, however, not of major proportions given 
the size of the total programme. Moreover, the discrepancy 
between expenditure and provision illustrated in Figure 2.9~ is 
not a true reflection of the extent to which actual output of 
local roads matched the output implied in the provision due to 
discrepancies between outturn road construction prices in any one 
year and the prices assumed by the Government when setting 
provision. The constant prices used in Figures 2.9a and 2.9b are 
based on the GDP deflator and this probably understates the 
change in output because between 1982 and 1985 (first quarters) 
the roads output price index increased by only 3.5% compared with 
an increase of 16% in the GDP deflator (H M Treasury, 1987, p 
135). This does not affect the comparison between outturn and 
provision shown in Figure 2.9~ but could indicate that this 
simple comparison is not a true measure of the extent to which 
the output of local roads did match the level assumed in the 
Governmentrs expenditure provisions. 
In explaining the trend of local transport capital expenditure 
relative to the Government's plans we can refer to the operation 
of both the TSG system, which supported such expenditure on 
highways-related and public transport programmes, and the wider 
capital expenditure control system. The TSG system will be 
considered in more detail in the next section but at this stage 
we can look briefly at the trends in local authorities1 TPP bids 
in respect of capital expenditure and these are shown in Figures 
2.12a to 2.12d. It can be seen that, following a significant 
real-terms reduction in bids in 1982/83 (cf. difficulties with 
the new capital control system and run-down of construction on 
the Tyne and Wear Metro), there was a subsequent substantial 
increase up to 1984/85 in bids by the GLC, the metropolitan 
counties and the shire counties. However, the proportion of bids 
accepted for TSG declined nationally, from 83% to 68% indicating 
a reduction in the extent to which the Governmentls provision met 
the perceived expenditure needs of local authorities. This 
decline was particularly marked in the GLC (85% down to 66%) and, 
to a lesser extent, the metropolitan counties (66% down to 53%) 
reflecting the greater importance of public transport expenditure 
in the capital programmes of these authorities and the declining 
provision made by the Government for such expenditure (Figures 
2.12b and 2.12~). In the shire counties the proportion of the 
capital bid accepted for TSG declined from 86% in 1982/83 to 77% 
in 1984/85. This represented a significant real terms increase 
in accepted expenditure in the shires (some 21%) probably 
reflecting the Government's priority over this period to roads 
capital expenditure on by-pass schemes designed to provide relief 
to towns and villages from the effects of lorry traffic. This 
priority was expressed in guidance, in particular, in the 
circular relating to 1983/84 TPP submissions which indicated that 
TSG support would be given to such schemes (Department of 
Transport, 1982, para 4). 
Notwithstanding this priority on the part of the Government, the 
evidence suggests that the shire counties in particular were 
experiencing difficulties with roads programmes. Thus, between 
1983/84 and 1984/85 expenditure increased by some 6% in cash 
terms compared with a 13% increase in accepted expenditure (total 
capital) and a 12% increase in the roads capital allocation (DTp 
data). In 1984/85 expenditure on roads by the shire counties was 
9% below the capital allocation. There are two aspects of the 
broader systems for controlling local authorities' expenditure 
which are relevant to this problem. First, we have seen in 
section 2.2 above that the shire counties faced some difficulty 
with restraints on current expenditure, particularly through the 
system of expenditure targets and penalties because in 1983/84 
and 1984/85 these authorities collectively faced targets below 
GRE. This, in turn, would have resulted in restraints on capital 
expenditure in order to restrict the burden of debt charges on 
revenue accounts. The second aspect relates to the operation of 
the capital expenditure control system and we shall now consider 
this in more detail. 
As indicated above, in the new capital control system introduced 
in 1981/82, capital allocations provided to authorities to cover 
prescribed expenditure were generally set below provision to 
allow for the use of capi*al receipts. Figure 2.10 shovs that 
authorities1 total transport capital expenditure over the period 
to 1984/85 consistently exceeded the allocation but, yp to 
1983/84 failed to reach the level of provision. This indicates 
that authorities were unable to use capital receipts to 
supplement transport expenditure on the scale assumed by the 
Government. However, the increasing availability of capital 
receipts to authorities over this period is reflected in the 
closing gap between expenditure and provision and the emergence 
of an overspend in 1984/85 (cf. Figure 2.9~). Nevertheless, as 
we have seen, this overspend was attributable to public transport 
and car parks suggesting that receipts were supporting such 
expenditure more than that on road construction and improvement. 
Indeed, local authorities' ability to supplement allocations from 
receipts was causing a substantial overspending problem in 
respect of total capital expenditure which contrasted with the 
underspending on roads programmes. By 1983/84 authorities were 
overspending by 16.5% on total expenditure compared with the 7% 
underspend on roads capital expenditure. In particular, 
education capital expenditure was 54% in excess of provision in 
1983/84 indicating a priority in the use of capital receipts to 
this service. This general overspending problem caused the 
Government to react by limiting the use of capital receipts by 
authorities in any one year to 'prescribed proportions' of 
income. In 1983/84 the 'prescribed proportion' for non-housing 
receipts was 50% but this has subsequently been reduced to 30%. 
However, this reaction to the general problem clearly did not 
help the specific problem of underspending on roads and in order 
to encourage authorities to increase their expenditure in this 
respect, the Government took the compensating step of 
supplementing transport capital allocations for 1983/84 and 
1984/85 by 50% of forecast local transport capital receipts. 
This would permit additional spending financed by borrowing if 
such receipts were not in fact available. 
Nevertheless, the persistence of underspending on roads and the 
failure of the shire counties in particular to spend up to 
allocations indicates the dual influence of restraints on current 
expenditure (via debt charges) and an inability (or 
unwillingness) of authorities to apply capital receipts to roads 
capital expenditure. As regards the latter problem, a 
substantial part of the difficulty arose from the distribution of 
expenditure and receipts between different authorities. This is 
illustrated in Figures 2.13a to 2.13d. The increasing use of 
capital receipts to supplement capital allocations in respect of 
prescribed expenditure is clearly evident, particularly over the 
period 1982/83 to 1984/85. However, it can be seen that the 
authorities generating and applying the largest amounts of 
receipts were precisely those with the least transport capital 
expenditure responsibilities, with the exception of the GLC. 
Thus, it was the lower tier authorities (London Boroughs, 
metropolitan and shire districts) which had the most receipts 
available but these were therefore applicable to a very limited 
part of the total transport programme mainly, in fact, car 
parking (explaining the substantial overspend on this item by 
1984/85). The GLC was also able to generate substantial receipts 
and, given the importance of public transport capital expenditure 
in this authority, and the priority given to such expenditure, it 
would appear that the use-mf receipts to supplement such spending 
contributed to the overspending which arose in 1983/84 and 
1984/85 (as discussed above cf. Figure 2.9~). 
On the other hand, the metropolitan and shire counties, which 
accounted for a substantial component of roads capital 
expenditure (over 85% in 1984/85), were unable to generate and 
apply large amounts of receipts to supplement their roads 
allocations and this will have contributed to the underspending 
on the roads provision. The situation would appear to have been 
particularly difficult for the shire counties in 1983/84 and 
1984/85 in view of the competition within these authorities from 
a wider range of services for the receipts which were available; 
the substantial overspending nationally on education is 
particularly relevant in this respect. 
This interpretation is supported by the trends in expenditure on 
roads and car parks between 1982/83 and 1984/85 illustrated in 
Figures 2.11a to 2.11f. The main features are, firstly, the 
growth in public transport expenditure in London; secondly, the 
significant increase in expenditure by the metropolitan and shire 
districts (much of which relates to car parking); and, thirdly, 
the relatively low real terms growth in expenditure in the 
metropolitan and shire counties (most of which relates to road 
construction and improvement). 
Therefore, it would appear to be possible to explain the trend in 
the relationship between local transport capital expenditure and 
provision primarily in terms of the wider system for controlling 
capital expenditure (together with the effects of the current 
expenditure restraints on debt charges). In particular, 
assumptions made by the Government in setting the relationship 
between allocations and provision about authorities1 ability to 
generate and apply capital receipts would seem to have been a 
major problem for the roads capital programme. However, in the 
decision to reform the TSG announced in 1984, the Government 
related the problem of underspending on roads more to the alleged 
excessive use of TSG by authorities to support current 
expenditure at the expense of capital expenditure and it is to 
the role of TSG relating to the wider expenditure control system 
that we turn in the next section. 
2.4 The Role of Transvort Suvvlementarv Grant 
The trend in the bids for TSG in respect of current expenditure 
on revenue support and maintenance was discussed briefly in 
Section 2.2 above (cf. Figures 2.5 and 2.6) and those in respect 
of capital expenditure referred to in the previous section (cf. 
Figure 2.12). Figures 2.14a - 2.14d show the trend between 
1979/80 and 1984/85 in total TPP bids, expenditure accepted for 
TSG and actual TSG paid in constant prices for England as a 
whole, the GLC, metropolitan counties and shire counties. In 
general terms it can be seen that between 1982/83 and 1984/85 
whereas total bids increased considerably and accepted 
expenditure also increased (but to a much lesser extent), total 
TSG paid to local authorities decreased (by 19% in real terms) 
and declined as a proportion of total accepted expenditure from 
28% to 21%. The decline in the proportion of total bids accepted 
for TSG from 87% in 1882/83 to 72% in 1984/85 indicates a 
significant decrease in the extent to which the Government's 
provision matched the perceived expenditure needs of .local 
authorities, particularly in London and the metropolitan areas. 
Comparison of Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.12 indicates the changing 
composition of bids over the period between, in particular, 
1981/82 and 1984/85. The first notable change occurred in 
1982/83 when the capital bid fell from the previous year while 
that for revenue support increased mainly due to changes in the 
metropolitan and shire counties. The shire counties benefitted 
in particular from the 1982/83 TSG settlement; as Figure 2.14 
shows, they received a real terms increase in grant at the 
expense of the GLC and MCCs. This was due to the significant 
increase in the accepted expenditure of the shire counties in 
1982/83, particularly in respect of capital expenditure (Figure 
2.12d) and road maintenance current expenditure (Figure 2.6d). 
This in turn reflects the Government's plans, firstly, in 
relation to roads capital expenditure, where the promotion of by- 
passes to provide relief from heavy lorries was a priority (cf 
above p. 17), and secondly, in relation to current expenditure, 
where provision was increased to compensate for substantial 
overspending in 1981/82. 
The second notable feature is the increasing divergence between 
bids and accepted expenditure from 1982/83 to 1984/85, 
particularly in London and the metropolitan counties, indicating 
the degree of conflict between the Government's policies and 
those of the GLC and MCCs. As we have seen, this is most clearly 
evident in respect of current expenditure on revenue support 
(Figure 2.5), but it also characterises capital expenditure 
reflecting, again, priorities in these authorities towards public 
transport in contrast to the reduction in provision by the 
Government (Figure 2.12). The Government's main priorities over 
this period, as reflected in the guidance to authorities for TPP 
preparation were firstly, to reduce current expenditure 
particularly on public transport revenue support and, secondly, 
to promote the construction of by-passes to towns and villages to 
provide relief from the effects of heavy lorries (Department of 
Transport, 1982, 1983). 
However, notwithstanding their role in sustaining expenditure 
trends at variance with the Government's plans and priorities, 
the GLC and MCCs were treated generously in the 1983/84 TSG 
settlement at the expense of the shire counties. As we have 
already seen the GLC and MCCs increased their share of a reduced 
amount of TSG in 1983/84, and Figure 2.14 shows that the GLC 
actually received a real increase in grant (cf 7%), while the 
shire counties experienced a 21% decrease in real terms. 
The reason for this shift in grant support to London and away, 
primarily, from the shire counties, lies in the methodology for 
the distribution of TSG, which is allocated to each county in 
such a way as to equalise most of the accepted expenditure per 
head of population. Thus, TSG is paid as a proportion of the 
amount by which an authority's total accepted expenditure per 
head exceeds a threshold per capita amount, the latter expressing 
the extent to which expenditure should be financed from rate 
income supported by block grant (see Sanderson, 1988, p 26-7). 
The method of calculation.and the relevant figures for the years 
1982/83 to 1984/85 are illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
The Distribution of TSG 1982/83 to 1984/85 
( C  1979/80 prices) 
i Accepted Expenditure per cap - Threshold X Rate = TSG per capita 
Year GLC MCCs Shire England Per of GLC MCCs Shire England 
CCs Capita Grant CCs 
NB: Figures do not compute precisely because the calculation is 'worked back' from 
published outturn data. 
Source: Department of Transport data. 
The nature of this distribution formula is such that, as the 
threshold value is raised, authorities with lower accepted 
expenditures (i.e. closer to the threshold) lose proportionately 
more TSG than authorities with higher accepted expenditures, so 
the latter benefit in terms of a higher proportion of the total 
TSG. This is indeed what happened in 1983/84 when the threshold 
was raised but the rate of grant was maintained at 70%; the GLC 
with a high accepted expenditure per head (and one significantly 
increased from 1982/83) received not only a higher proportion of 
a reduced total grant (down 5% in real terms from 1982/83) but 
also a higher amount in real terms. The metropolitan counties 
received a slightly increased share (but a real terms reduction 
in amount) while the shire counties, with their relatively low 
accepted expenditure (and small increase from 1982/83), received 
a significantly reduced share and amount (Table 2.2). 
Looking at the situation in slightly more detail, Figures 2.5 and 
2.12 show the increase in accepted expenditure for the GLC and 
MCCs in 1983/84 in respect of current expenditure on revenue 
support and capital expenditure. As regards revenue support, we 
saw in Section 2.2 above that the increase in accepted 
expenditure contradicted the decrease in provision in the 
Government's spending plans; thus, accepted expenditure increased 
nationally by 13% in real terms while provision decreased by 10%. 
The increase in accepted expenditure can be related to the 
introduction of PELs in the 1983 Transport Act, which tended to 
confuse the issue of what constituted the appropriate yardstick 
for determining 'overspending' (see above p. 8-10) . In 
particular, because the sum of PELs exceeded provision and 
because the level of accepted expenditure was related to PELs, 
total accepted expenditure for revenue support in 1983/84 
exceeded provision by 26% (whereas it had been equal to provision 
in 1982/83). 
The decision to raise the threshold for accepted expenditure per 
capita above which TSG was paid in 1983/84 in the distribution of 
the smaller amount (in real terms) of TSG available accentuated 
the effect of the increased accepted expenditure, especially in 
respect of the GLC. Thus, if the rate of grant had been reduced 
to 56% and the threshold left at its 1982/83 level in real terms, 
the GLC would have received a lower share of TSG (39% instead of 
45%) and the shire counties a higher share (35% instead of 29%), 
with the MCCs retaining the same share of 27%. This would have 
produced a more equitable sharing out of TSG, since the shire 
counties would have experienced a reduction of 5% (instead of the 
actual 21%) and the GLC a reduction of 9% (compared with the 
actual increase of 7%). This would also have been rather more 
consistent with the Government's policies and spending plans. 
In the event, the significant reduction in TSG received by the 
shire counties in 1983/84 left them with a higher proportion of 
their (increased) accepted expenditure to be funded from rate 
income (supported by block grant) in the case of current 
expenditure, and from borrowing (within capital allocations) in 
the case of capital expenditure (supplemented by capital 
receipts). This presented the shire counties with difficulties 
on two fronts. On the one hand, they were thereby more exposed 
to the effects of the broader system for control of -current 
expenditure, both the basic block grant system and the system of 
targets and penalties which, as was discussed in Section 2.2.3 
above, subjected these authorities to increasingly Severe 
restraints between 1982/83 and in 1984/85. This situation is 
reflected in the real terms decline in current expenditure on 
revenue support and maintenance in the shire areas in 1983/84 (- 
4%) and the change from an 'overspend' against accepted 
expenditure on these items of 5.3% in 1982/83 to an 'underspend' 
of 2.2% in 1983/84. 
On the other hand, the shire counties were also more exposed to 
the effects of the capital expenditure control system. We saw in 
Section 2.3 above that in 1983/84 allocations for capital 
expenditure were set below provision to allow for the application 
of capital receipts, although 50% of forecast receipts were added 
to allocations. We also saw that the shire counties suffered in 
the operation of this system due to their relatively low ability 
to generate receipts for application in respect of transport 
capital expenditure (see p. 18-19). In such a context, the 
reduction in TSG support for these authorities in 1983/84 can 
only have hindered their roads capital programmes at a time when 
the Government was increasing the roads provision and attempting, 
in particular, to promote by-pass schemes of a kind which tend to 
figure prominently in the shires' roads programmes. 
At the same time, the increase in TSG support received by the GLC 
in 1983/84 would have afforded more protection from the 
Government8s broad financial control mechanisms at a time when 
the Government was, in fact, attempting to impose greater 
control. In respect of current expenditure, it is also notable 
(as discussed in Section 2.2.3 above) that the GLC received an 
expenditure target in 1984/85 significantly in excess of its GRE 
thus reducing the potential impact of penalties. These factors 
must have helped the GLC to maintain increases in current 
expenditure in excess of accepted expenditure levels. As regards 
capital expenditure, Figure 2.11 shows the large increase in 
expenditure on public transport in London in 1983/84 (23% up from 
1982/83 in real terms) which contradicted the national trend in 
provision (down 7%) and contributed to the emergence of 
overspending on public transport capital (cf. Figure 2.9~). 
Again, the 1983/84 TSG settlement must have contributed to this 
situation. 
Therefore, the 1983/84 TSG settlement would appear to have helped 
to sustain trends in expenditure by local authorities in 
contradiction to the Government's own policies and spending plans 
at a crucial juncture in the context of the Government's efforts 
to bring local transport spending into line with those plans. 
Because of its contribution to this situation (by increasing 
revenue support accepted expenditure above provision) the 1983 
Transport Act can be seen as a rather perverse piece of 
legislation, its dubious effectiveness reinforcing the dubious 
validity of the fiduciary concept underlying the Act (cf. 
Sanderson (1988, p 39-43)). In fact, the situation in 1983/84 
produces the impression of a lack of a coherent and co-ordinated 
approach in the control of local authorities transport 
expenditure, in particular, an apparent failure to assess 
adequately the interactions between the TSG system, the wider 
current and capital expegditure control systems, and specific 
legislation introduced in response to a particular problem. This 
raises questions about the adequacy of co-ordination arrangements 
between, in particular, the Departments of Transport and the 
Environment, and the Treasury. 
The importance of TSG settlements in influencing local transport 
expenditure trends relative to the effect of the wider 
expenditure control systems is difficult to assess. Although the 
1983/84 picture does suggest evidence of its influence, the 
picture in 1984/85 is less clear. In the 1984/85 TSG settlement 
action was taken to redress the balance in favour of the shire 
counties (following their protests after the 1983/84 settlement). 
However, the total amount of TSG available was reduced by 15% in 
real terms from 1983/84. The shire counties received a much 
higher proportion than in 1983/84 (38% up from 29%), primarily at 
the expense of the GM: (35% down from 45%); these shares 
represented an increase in the amount of grant in real terms for 
the shire counties of 13% and a decrease for the GLC of 32%. 
This redistribution was the result of a reduction in both the 
threshold value of accepted expenditure per capita and the rate 
of grant; thus, a lower rate of grant was paid on a higher 
proportion of counties' accepted expenditures benefitting 
authorities with lower accepted expenditures, i.e. mainly shire 
counties (see Table 2.2). Moreover, the GLC, in particular, 
suffered a large reduction in its accepted expenditures 
especially in respect of revenue support (Figure 2.5b) and 
capital (Figure 2.12b). On the other hand, the shire counties 
experienced increases in accepted expenditures for capital 
(Figure 2.12d) and maintenance (Figure 2.6d). It is notable 
that, in 1984/85, the extent to which revenue support accepted 
expenditure exceeded provision was significantly reduced from 
1983/84 as the proportion of PELs accepted for TSG was reduced 
(Figures 2.5a and 2.5~). 
Changes in expenditure between 1983/84 and 1984/85 do not wholly 
reflect the changes in TSG indicating the importance of the wider 
financial control mechanisms. The significant reduction in 
public transport capital expenditure in London in 1984/85 (down 
12% in real terms from 1983/84) is consistent with the reduction 
in capital accepted expenditure and TSG (Figure 2.11b) but 
current expenditure in London on revenue support and maintenance 
continued to grow and the degree of overspend against accepted 
expenditure increased (Figures 2.5b and 2.6b). This suggests 
decisions to protect current expenditure (particularly revenue 
support) from the loss of TSG somewhat at the expense of capital 
expenditure. On the other hand, in the shires current 
expenditure on revenue support and maintenance continued to 
decrease in real terms in spite of increases in accepted 
expenditure and TSG (Figures 2.5d and 2.6d). In particular, road 
maintenance expenditure in the shires fell below accepted 
expenditure in 1984/85. Moreover, roads capital expenditure in 
the shire counties increased by only a small amount (c. 1%) in 
real terms (Figure 2.1ld), much less than the increase in 
accepted expenditure, and the overall degree of underspending on 
roads was not significantly reduced from 1983/84 (Figure 2.9~). 
This persistence of underspending on roads suggests the 
importance of difficulties with the wider capital control 
system, as discussed earlier in Section 2.3. 
.- 
In spite of the evidence to suggest the importance of the role of 
the wider current and capital expenditure control systems in 
explaining trends in local transport expenditure, the Government 
focussed on the role of TSG in promoting expenditure patterns at 
odds with its policies and spending plans. In the ~epartment of 
Transport circular outlining the reform of the TSG system in 1984 
the change was rationalised in the following terms: 
"TSG was intended to support local transport expenditure 
generally. But in recent years authorities have spent more 
on transport revenue expenditure (particularly on public 
transport revenue support) than provided in the Government's 
public expenditure plans, while they have underspent the 
provision for transport capital expenditure. The Government 
wishes to concentrate the extra support provided through TSG 
on highways capital expenditure which is of more than local 
importance, in particular investment on roads which form 
part of the primary route network of major through routes, 
important urban roads, and bypasses and relief roads which 
relieve communities of the effects of heavy through 
traffic. 'l 
(Department of Transport, 1984A, para 2) 
Implicit in this rationalisation, then, is the assertion that 
authorities diverted an excessive amount of TSG to support 
current expenditure on public transport in excess of the 
Governmentts provisions, and that this contributed to 
underspending on transport capital, particularly in respect of 
roads. We can examine this assertion on two levels. First, what 
evidence is there to support the assertion, on the one hand, that 
authorities applied TSG primarily to support revenue expenditure 
and, on the other hand, that this contributed to underspending on 
roads capital? Second, if indeed such evidence does exist to 
what extent does this in itself provide a basis for reforming the 
TSG system? 
On the first level, the previous discussion in this section has 
suggested that the role of TSG in influencing expenditure 
patterns and trends must be examined within the context of the 
broader current and capital expenditure control systems. In 
general terms, the role of TSG in local transport expenditure 
declined between 1979/80 and 1984/85 due to the reduction in 
total TSG by 21% in real terms. Over that period it declined as 
a proportion of total expenditure on revenue support, maintenance 
and highways and public transport capital from 28% to 18% so 
there was a corresponding increase in the relative influence of 
block grant on the one hand and capital allocations on the 
other. Indeed, the reduction in the role of TSG is particularly 
marked since 1982/83 when it constituted some 25% of total 
eligible expenditure. Of course, over the period 1982/83 to 
1984/85 the system of expenditure targets and grant penalties 
became more severe (as described in Section 2.2.3) and the role 
of capital receipts in the capital expenditure control system 
became more problematical (as described in Section 2.3) which 
will have served to reinforce the declining influence of TSG. 
Nevertheless, we have seeg.that there is evidence to suggest that 
the 1983/84 TSG settlement in particular may have had some effect 
on authoritiesr expenditure patterns, serving to promote or 
reinforce the very patterns and trends which were causing the 
Government so much concern. It is clear that the problem 
generated by TSG from the Governmentts point of view arose from 
the discretion of local authorities to spend the unhypothecated 
grant as they wished; the complaint was, therefore, essentially 
about the spending priorities and decisions of certain 
authorities - particularly the GLC and metropolitan counties. It 
was somewhat disingenuous, then, on the Go~ernment's part on the 
one hand to decide upon a TSG settlement in 1983/84 which 
provided more resources to the discretion of those rproblemr 
authorities while on the other hand proposing to change the 
system in order to overcome the results of the exercise of that 
discretion. 
As regards the extent to which TSG was used by authorities to 
support revenue expenditure at the expense of capital 
expenditure, the available evidence is presented in Figures 2.15a 
to 2.15d which compare the proportion of revenue expenditure in 
total expenditure accepted for TSG with the proportion of TSG 
estimated to have been applied by local authorities in respect of 
revenue expenditure (the latter from CIPFAs Finance and General 
Statistics). Figure 2.15a shows that, nationally, there was 
indeed an increasing tendency to support revenue spending with 
TSG particularly between 1982/83 and 1984/85, the years in which 
there was persistent high overspending on revenue support 
relative to the Government's plans. However, even in 1984/85 the 
proportion of TSG applied to revenue was only slightly in excess 
of the pro ortion of revenue expenditure in total accepted 
expenditure. 9 
Nevertheless, the picture varies by local authority class, as 
shown in Figures 2.15b - 2.15d. It is clear that there was a 
greater tendency to apply TSG in respect of revenue expenditure 
in the metropolitan counties than in the GLC and the shire 
counties. The increase in 1980/81 relates to the substantial 
increase in TPP bids and in actual expenditure on revenue support 
in that year (cf. Figure 2.5~) on the basis of the relatively 
favourable TPP guidance in respect of revenue support given 
towards the end of the Labour Government's term of office. The 
subsequent restraints exercised by the new Conservative 
Government, and the real terms cut in TSG for 1980/81, which 
particularly affected the MCCs (see Figures 2.15a and 2.15~)~ 
explain the increased use of the available TSG to support revenue 
expenditure particularly (it would be reasonable to surmise) on 
public transport support. In 1981/82 the increased use of TSG to 
support capital expenditure coincides with the introduction of 
the new capital control system; in Section 2.3 we saw that 
highways capital expenditure in the MCCs did not fall in 1981/82 
to the same degree as in the shire counties and this might be 
explained in part by the increased use of TSG to support such 
expenditure. Over the period 1982/83 to 1984/85, however, the 
metropolitan counties applied most of their TSG to revenue 
................................................................. 
l We make the assumption here that block grant (RSG) support 
would apply to TSG-eligible expenditure within the threshold 
in proportion to accepted expenditures for current and 
capital items (the latter supported via -revenue 
contributions - RCCOs). 
expenditure (in excess of the revenue proportion of accepted 
expenditure) and, as we have seen, this was a period of continued 
high overspending by these authorities on public transport 
revenue support in spite of the Governmentls efforts to bring 
such expenditure into line with their plans. 
The GLC also displays an increasing trend in the proportion of 
TSG taken to revenue account but even in 1984/85 this proportion 
was still below the proportion of revenue in accepted expenditure 
(which was considerably lower than in the MCCs). We saw in 
Section 2.3 that capital expenditure on public transport was much 
more important in London that in other areas and, therefore, TSG 
will have played a greater role in supporting the GLC1s 
expenditure in this respect. This is illustrated to some extent 
by the pattern for 1983/84 when, as we have seen, the GLC 
received a real terms increase in TSG in spite of a decrease in 
the national total. There was no marked increase in the 
proportion of TSG applied to revenue in that year and the 
increase in outturn expenditure on revenue support was less than 
in the previous year (Figures 2.15b and 2.5b); capital 
expenditure on highways actually decreased in real terms but 
public transport capital expenditure increased significantly 
suggesting, as argued above, that the increase in TSG was used 
mainly to support such expenditure. 
In the shire counties the role of TSG in supporting revenue 
expenditure increased considerably between 1981/82 and 1983/84 
and in the latter year exceeded the revenue proportion of 
accepted expenditure by a significant degree. However, we have 
seen that these authorities were underspending on revenue support 
over this period (Figure 2.5d); indeed, the degree of underspend 
increased in 1983/84 as expenditure actually declined in real 
terms in spite of the increase in the proportion of TSG used to 
support revenue expenditure. This indicates that (as expected) 
the revenue expenditure picture is dominated by road maintenance 
and the increase in the role of TSG in supporting such 
expenditure relates to the growing problems faced by the shire 
counties in matching the Government's provision for road 
maintenance due to the operation of wider expenditure controls, 
particularly expenditure targets and grant penalties (see Section 
2.2.3). Thus, in 1983/84 when the shire counties faced a 
sizeable real terms cut in TSG the proportion of TSG applied to 
revenue increased significantly (Figure 2.15d) indicating an 
attempt to protect road maintenance expenditure in particular. 
On the other hand, in 1984/85 when the balance in the 
distribution of TSG was redressed in favour of the shire 
counties, the proportion applied to revenue decreased indicating 
moves by these authorities to promote roads capital expenditure. 
This picture is, therefore, not totally consistent with the 
Governmentls argument that the application of TSG to support 
revenue expenditure on public transport was a factor contributing 
to underspending on transport capital expenditure. There is 
evidence that this may have been the case in the metropolitan 
counties but the effect of this on the total transport capital 
programme is limited because these authorities in 1984/85 
accounted for less than 20% of highways capital expenditure 
(which was the focus .of the Government's concern- about 
underspending). The evidence in respect of the GLC suggests a 
tendency to favour public transport capital expenditure with TSG 
support. In the shire counties the increased use of TSG to 
support revenue expenditure applies mainly to road maintenance 
and can be related to the operation of the Government's own 
measures and decisions both in respect of TSG settlements and of 
the wider operation of the block grant system, targets and 
penalties. 
On the basis of the above evidence we would have to conclude that 
decisions by authorities in relation to the division of TSG 
between revenue and capital accounts played a relatively limited 
role in the problem, as perceived by the Government, of 
overspending on revenue support and underspending on roads 
capital. The latter problem would seem to be mainly attributable 
to the operation of the capital expenditure control system (plus 
the effect of current expenditure restraints on debt charges). 
As regards overspending on public transport current (and capital) 
expenditure this was the outcome of the policies and priorities 
of (primarily) the GLC and the metropolitan counties and 
presumably would have occurred irrespective of the availability 
of TSG. This obviously raises a question mark against the 
Government's reasons for reforming the TSG system. In fact, the 
issue would appear to turn upon the preparedness of the 
Government to continue with the principle of an unhypothecated 
grant to support local transport expenditure for use at 
authorities' discretion in accordance with their policies and 
priorities. 
From the point of view of the basic principle underlying the 
TPP/TSG system as introduced in 1975/76 the Government should not 
have been excessively concerned about the way in which 
authorities used TSG because it was intended to be a 
supplementary block grant in support of authorities' local 
transport programmes as a whole (Mackie, 1980). However, almost 
from its inception, as successive governments imposed 
increasingly severe restraints on public expenditure, there was a 
growing tension, not to say conflict, between this principle of 
local discretion and the desire of central government to achieve 
control over local authority spending so as to bring it into line 
with public expenditure plans and provisions (ibid. p 200-202). 
This conflict has focussed primarily on the issue of public 
transport revenue support, as we have seen, and, true to the 
prediction of Mackie (op cit, p 204), has constituted a good test 
of the Government's faith in local discretion. The decision to 
reform the TSG system, abolishing support for current expenditure 
essentially illustrates the Government's lack of faith in local 
discretion when the outcome of that discretion contradicts its 
own policies. The subsequent transfer of responsibility for 
public transport in London from GLC to LRT and the abolition of 
the GLC and MCCs (with rate-capped PTAs taking over public 
transport in the metropolitan areas) further circumscribed 
drastically the degree of local discretion which could be 
exercised in respect of public transport expenditure in London 
and the metropolitan areas, as will be discussed in Section 3. 
2.5 Discussion 
It is important, then, to see the reform of the TSG system as the 
component of a broader set of changes introduced by the 
Government with the objective of increasing the ability to ensure 
that local authorities' expenditure conforms with central 
government spending plans and provisions. (These changes will be 
considered in more detail in the next section.) Indeed, the 
change to the TSG system to some extent epitomises a 
strengthening of the approach to the Conservative Government in 
their second term of office to the issue of controlling local 
government expenditure. We have seen (section 2.2.1) that, in 
spite of the efforts of this Government during their first term, 
local government current expenditure increased and a significant 
overspending problem developed in respect of public transport 
revenue support. This was primarily due to the policies and 
priorities of Labour Councils in London and the metropolitan 
counties which came into increasing conflict with the Government 
over their response to problems exacerbated by the economic 
recession of the early 1980s. Notwithstanding the introduction 
of new expenditure control methods in 1981/82 local authorities 
were left with considerable discretion over the level and 
composition of their expenditure and the freedom to exceed the 
Governmentls targets and provisions if they were prepared and 
able to pass on the financial consequences to local ratepayers. 
The principle of local government discretion was built into the 
arrangements for Transport Supplementary Grant, a block grant to 
support authorities1 local transport policies and programmes as a 
whole. The Government's dissatisfaction with these arrangements 
for TSG reflected their wider frustration at the apparent 
inability to exercise control over local authorities1 
expenditure, in terms of both level and composition, so as to 
bring such expenditure into line with central government 
expenditure plans. The exercise of discretion within the broader 
expenditure control mechanisms by the GLC and metropolitan 
counties was the main source of discrepancy with the Government's 
plans and TSG underwrote expenditure patterns in these 
authorities which were the primary focus of the Governmentfs 
concern. We have seen (sections 2.2 and 2.3) that the central 
problem, from the Government's point of view, was, on the one 
hand, excessive spending by these authorities on public 
transport, both revenue support for 'cheap fares' policies and 
capital expenditure, and, on the other hand, a general 
underspending on roads capital expenditure which was frustrating 
the Government's policy of giving priority to the construction of 
by-passes and relief roads to provide relief for communities from 
heavy traffic. 
However, our analysis (section 2.4) suggests that the TSG system 
per se was not the main factor in this problem and that the 
Government exaggerated its role in its reasoning behind the 
reform. The main factor behind the overspending on public 
transport was the policies and priorities of the GLC and 
metropolitan counties which would doubtless have resulted in 
expenditure patterns in conflict with the Government's plans 
even in the absence of TSG support for current and capital 
expenditure on public transport. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
that TSG support did serve to sustain this pattern of 
overspending due to its unhypothecated nature so the reform to 
the system can be understood in the context of other measures to 
achieve control over public transport expenditure in the major 
conurbations. 
The other side of the coin was the persistent underspending 
between 1981/82 and 1984/85 on roads capital expenditure which 
was frustrating the achievement, in particular, of the 
Government's developing priorities in relation to the 
construction of by-passes and relief roads to serve heavier and 
longer distance traffic. Again, our analysis (sections 2.3 and 
2.4) suggests that the issue of the way in which authorities 
applied TSG was secondary to the effect of the operation of the 
capital expenditure control system, supplemented by current 
expenditure restraints which affected debt charges on borrowing 
for roads capital expenditure. In particular, the way in which 
capital receipts were treated in setting capital allocations 
relative to gross provision placed the metropolitan and shire 
counties at a disadvantage in terms of the amount of receipts 
actually available to supplement borrowing for roads expenditure. 
The problem was exacerbated by competition from other priority 
services for the available receipts, particularly in the shire 
counties with their responsibilities for education and social 
services (section 2.3). 
More generally, during the period up to 1984/85 we can discern 
two basic characteristics of the system of local government 
finance which, in their interaction, serve to explain the 
problems faced by the Government in bringing local authorities' 
transport expenditure into line with central government spending 
plans. The first characteristic of the system is its complexity 
and the interactive nature of its various parts such that changes 
made to one part to solve one problem have knock-on effects on 
other problems. In relation to local transport expenditure there 
are two particular problem areas: firstly, the effect on various 
components of transport expenditure of changes in the broader 
control mechanisms designed to address problems with expenditure 
generally or on other services; and, secondly, the relationship 
between the TSG system and these broader expenditure control 
mechanisms. These problem areas also raise the issue of the 
relationship between the Treasury (which plays a leading role in 
developing central government spending plans), the Department of 
the Environment (which has the main responsibility for the 
broader systems for control of local government expenditure) and 
the Department of Transport (which has the responsibility of 
securing resources for local transport expenditure within the 
context of the Government's spending plans and for distributing 
TSG between local authorities). Our analysis has indicated 
various ways in which problems developed from this first 
characteristic of the local government finance system. 
We have seen, for example (section 2.3), that changes were 
introduced in 1983/84 in the system for capital expenditure 
control to deal with the problem of overspending in general (and 
on certain services such as housing and education) due to the 
large increase in the amounts of capital receipts accruing to 
local authorities from sales of land and assets. This limitation 
on the use of receipts combined with over-optimistic assumptions 
by the Government about the ability and preparedness of 
authorities to apply available receipts to expenditure on. roads 
in competition with other services was a major factor, as we have 
seen, in the underspending on roads capital expenditure and the 
frustration of Government policies to promote the construction of 
by-passes and relief roads. 
As regards the current expenditure control system, expenditure 
targets and penalties were introduced to address the problem of a 
significant degree of overspending by certain local authorities, 
primarily in London and metropolitan areas. However, we saw in 
Section 2.2.3 above that authorities in these areas were given 
targets in 1983/84 and 1984/85 significantly in excess of their 
GREs (in order to be realistic in relation to actual expenditure 
levels) in spite of the fact that these authorities were 
primarily responsible for the large overspend in relation to the 
Government's spending plans. On the other hand, the shire 
counties collectively received targets below GRE placing greater 
pressure, in particular, on road maintenance expenditure which 
declined in real terms in these authorities and fell below the 
Government's provision in 1984/85. 
These contradictory impacts of the general expenditure control 
systems were exacerbated in 1983/84 by a TSG settlement which 
provided more resources to the GLC and metropolitan counties for 
use at their discretion in relation to local transport 
expenditure at a time when the exercise of that discretion was 
the main source of conflict between the Government and local 
authorities (section 2.4). In particular the GLC received a real 
terms increase in TSG at a time when its target in respect of 
current expenditure was significantly relaxed, thus helping to 
sustain revenue support expenditure, and when an increase in 
capital receipts helped to promote capital expenditure on public 
transport, in contradiction to the Governmentfs policies and 
provision. On the other hand, the shire counties received less 
resources at a time when relatively harsh expenditure targets 
were impacting upon road maintenance expenditure and when the 
capital expenditure control system was placing restraints on 
these authoritiesf ability to pursue roads capital expenditure in 
accordance with Government policies. 
Our analysis has indicated that the introduction of PELs 
following the 1983 Transport Act was a factor influencing the 
1983/84 TSG settlement because the sum of PELs exceeded the 
provision for revenue support expenditure in the Government's 
spending plans and because decisions on the levels of such 
expenditure accepted for TSG were made with reference to PELs 
rather than provision. Therefore, leaving aside criticisms of 
its leaal basis. the 1983 Act can be seen as beina of dubious 
~ - -  ~ ~~ ~~~-  - .~  
effecti&ness to ihe extent that, in combination w i k  the 1983/84 
TSG settlement, it helped to sustain patterns of local transport 
- 
expenditure significantly at odds with the Government's own 
spending plans at an important juncture in the context of the 
Government's efforts to bring local transport spending into line 
with those plans. 
The above problems give the impression of a lack of a coherent 
and co-ordinated approach in the control of local authoritiesf 
transport expenditure but also indicate the complexity -of the 
system and the inability of the Government to achieve 
simultaneously a variety of objectives relating, on the one hand, 
to the control of the level of local authorities1 expenditure 
and, on the other hand, to influencing the pattern of such 
expenditure relative to central government spending plans. There 
is clearly a limit to the level of detailed control which the 
Government can exercise through the general systems relating to 
current and capital expenditure and, as we shall see in the next 
section, in developments since 1984 the Government has 
strengthened its control through measures supplementing these 
general control systems. However, during the period up to 
1984/85 the limit to control faced by the Government indicates 
the importance of a second major characteristic of the system of 
local government finance which is also at work in the problems 
outlined above. This relates to the right of local authorities 
to determine their own expenditure priorities and to exercise 
their own discretion within a framework of policies and financial 
support provided by central government. 
This principle of local discretion is, to a degree built into the 
general systems for controlling local authority expenditure. 
Thus, notwithstanding the role of GREs as the basis for the 
distribution of block grant, local authorities are free to 
determine their own priorities for current expenditure subject to 
rules for abatement of grant as expenditure increases. 
Similarly, although authorities receive allocations for capital 
expenditure relating to service blocks, they are free to 
aggregate these allocations and determine their own priorities 
for capital expenditure within the total. The use of prescribed 
receipts is also subject to authorities' own discretion. Up to 
1984/85 TSG was an unhypothecated grant to support current and 
capital expenditure on roads and public transport and could be 
applied to eligible expenditure items at authoritiest own 
discretion. 
Therefore, the problems experienced by the Government up to 
1984/85 in bringing local authorities1 local transport 
expenditure into line with central government spending plans can 
be seen, to some extent, as evidence of the strength and 
importance of the role of local discretion. The problems 
outlined above provide examples of the way in which the exercise 
of discretion by local authorities interacted with difficulties 
generated by the effects of changes to expenditure control 
systems, to produce expenditure patterns at odds with the 
Governmentls policies and plans. 
Thus, the capital expenditure control system, and changes made in 
respect of capital receipts, created difficulties for the shire 
counties, for example, in terms of the availability of receipts 
to supplement allocations but the fact that roads capital 
expenditure appears to have suffered in competition with other 
services for the available receipts is due to the degree of 
priority assigned to roads programnes within the authority 
relative to other capital programmes (section 2.3). Similarly, 
the decline in current expenditure on road maintenance in the 
shire counties in 1983/84 and 1984/85 when relatively harsh 
expenditure targets were imposed was basically due to the 
priority assigned by authorities to such expenditure relative to 
that on, for example, educgtion, social services, police and fire 
which either remained relatively static or increased (section 
2.2.3). Also, the ability of authorities to use TSG at the.ir own 
discretion supported the ability of authorities to sustain 
expenditure patterns at variance with the Government's plans. 
Therefore, the fundamental problem faced by the Government over 
the period up to 1984 can be seen as deriving from the 
interaction of, on the one hand, difficulties of complexity and 
co-ordination of expenditure control systems and, on the other 
hand, the discretion of local authorities to determine their own 
expenditure priorities within the context of these control 
systems. In the next section we examine the implications of 
changes introduced by the Government since 1984 which can be seen 
as attempting to address both these aspects of the problem. 
These measures serve to strengthen the degree of central 
"qovernment control over local authorities' expenditure throuqh 
- 
ioth developments of the expenditure control system and a 
reduction in the scope of local authority discretion in relation 
to local transport expenditure in the major conurbations. 
3. Local Trans~ort Emenditure Since 1984/85 
3.1 Introduction 
Since 1984 the Government has introduced a number of legislative 
measures which have had a substantial impact on local 
authorities' transport expenditure, particularly in relation to 
public transport. The effect of these measures is indicated by 
the fact that the proportional contribution of public transport 
capital and current expenditure (excluding concessionary fares) 
to toal local authority transport expenditure declined between 
1984/85 and 1987/88 (budgets) from 31% to 15%. On the other hand 
expenditure on roads (current and capital) increased as a 
proportion of the total from 51% to 64% {H M Treasury, 1988, 
Table 8.1). This significant shift in the balance of local 
transport expenditure has also been accompanied by a change in 
the nature of the problem of the relationship of local 
authorities' expenditure to the Government's spending plans. 
Thus, in 1984/85, as we have seen, the Government's concern was 
mainly with overspending, particularly in relation to the 
provision for public transport. By 1987/88 the focus of concern 
was with underspending, particularly in relation to the provision 
for road maintenance (current) and construction/improvement 
(capital) . 
Because of the large number of changes since 1984 affecting local 
authorities' transport expenditure it is difficult to identify 
the relative impacts of the various measures from general data 
on expenditure trends. This complicates the analysis, in 
particular, of the implications of the reform of the TSG system 
which, as we have seen, restricted TSG support to capital 
expenditure on roads 'of more than local importance' from 
1985/86. In order to set this latter analysis in the context of 
the range of wider changes, we examine briefly the impact of 
these changes in the next section before going on to address the 
specific issue of the reform of the TSG system. 
3.2 Recent Develovments Affectina Local Transvort Emenditure 
We saw in Section 2 above that the Government's specific concern 
to reduce expenditure on public transport revenue support in 
London and the metropolitan counties was manifested in the 1983 
Transport Act. However, our analysis suggests that the 
achievements of this legislation are, at best, open to question 
and that in some respects the Act had some rather perverse 
effects. Certainly, in 1984/85 there was still a substantial 
degree of overspending on public transport current expenditure by 
the GM: and metropolitan counties which was causing concern for 
the Government. Moreover, these authorities contributed to the 
substantial overspend against the Government's provision for 
public transport capital expenditure. However, in 1985/86 
overspending on revenue support decreased substantially while 
local authorities' capital expenditure on public transport came 
into line with provision (see Figures 2.1-2.3, 2.9). 
The main reason for this-was the transfer of responsibili-ty for 
most public transport in London from the GLC to central 
government through the establishment of London Regional Tra.nsport 
(LRT) as a nationalised industry under the London Regional 
Transport Act 1984. The Secretary of State assumed full control 
over the level of financing of LRT in 1985/86; for 1984/85 the 
budget agreed by the GLC was used to fund LRT even though it was 
in excess of the Government's provision. This transfer resulted 
in a substantial reduction in expenditure on local public 
transport in England under local authority control - 41% in real 
terms for current expenditure and 73% for capital expenditure 
between 1984/85 and 1985/86 (cf. Figures 2.1 and 2.9a). As 
regards expenditure on public transport in London, Figure 3.1 
shows the substantial reduction in current expenditure on revenue 
support by LRT. The 1985/86 expenditure allowed by the Secretary 
of State represented a 41% reduction in real terms from the 
1984/85 expenditure by the GLC and since 1985/86 current 
expenditure by LRT has been more than halved (to 1987/88 
forecast) in line with the Government's objectives (H M Treasury, 
1987, p 392-3). 
In contrast to this reduction in current expenditure, Figure 2.9a 
indicates that capital expenditure by LRT has increased since 
1985/86 in real terms - by some 17% to the 1987/88 forecast. In 
fact, as Figure 2.11b shows, LRTfs investment expenditure in 
1985/86 represented a significant increase from the total capital 
expenditure on public transport in London in 1984/85 (some 26% in 
real terms). There is some irony in this in view of the fact 
that the 1984/85 level of expenditure was in excess of the 
Government's provision by some 11%, contributing to the general 
local authority overspend on public transport capital of 18% (cf. 
Figure 2.9). Therefore, the balance of expenditure on public 
transport in London has changed considerably since control passed 
from local to central government; in 1984/85 60% of the total was 
current and 40% capital whereas LRTfs forecast expenditure for 
1987/88 is 20% revenue support and 80% capital investment 
(Department of Environment: Local Government Financial 
Statistics 1984/85; Department of Transport, 1987). This trend 
reflects the Government's stated objectives for public transport 
in London which are to increase the attractiveness and efficiency 
of the system and thereby promote increased revenue and higher 
productivity (i.e. improving the prospects for the system to 
operate without revenue subsidies) 
(H M Treasury, 1987, p 392-3). 
Since 1985/86, then, expenditure on public transport under local 
authority control has been dominated by the provincial 
metropolitan areas. In 1985/86 the overspend against the 
Government's provision for current expenditure on revenue support 
(c. 44%) was attributable to the metropolitan counties which, as 
Figure 3.2 shows, spent in excess of GRE in contrast to the 
underspend in the shire counties. Capital expenditure on public 
transport was virtually wholly accounted for by the MCCs and was 
in line with provision in 1985/86 (Figures 2.9~ and 2.11). The 
current expenditure picture in 1985/86 in the metropolitan 
counties was affected by the introduction of the 'selective rate 
limitation schemef (rate-capping) under the terms of the 1984 
Rates Act, and the inclusion in the list of rate-capped 
authorities of two metropolitan counties (Merseyside and South 
Yorkshire). The GLC and-several London Borough Councils were 
also included and this had implications for current expenditure 
on road maintenance (Department of Environment, 1984A). 
As regards Merseyside and South Yorkshire Metropolitan Counties, 
these councils had provided relatively high levels of revenue 
support for public transport, accounting for nearly half of the 
increase in budgeted expenditure on this item in the metropolitan 
counties between 1980/81 and 1982/83 and in 1984/85 accounted for 
nearly half of the total budgets of the MCCs for revenue support 
compared with about 27% of the total MCC budgets for all 
services, excluding revenue support and concessionary fares 
(CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 1980/81-1984/85). The 
expenditure levels (ELs) given to these authorities in 1985/86 
under the selective scheme represented virtually 'stand still8 
budgets in real terms from the previous year and, in the event, 
revenue support expenditure was reduced by Merseyside by some 8% 
in real terms but increased slightly in South Yorkshire. This 
compares with a decrease of 9.5% from 1984/85 in total revenue 
support expenditure by the MCCs, the largest declines being in 
Tyne and Wear (- 24%) and West Yorkshire (- 19%). This would 
suggest that the metropolitan counties affected by rate-capping 
were able to provide some protection to revenue support 
expenditure in comparison with other MCCs which were, of course, 
subject to the broader system of expenditure targets and 
penalties, which was made more severe in 1985/86. 
The effects of rate-capping and grant penalties in 1985/86 
provided the broader environment in which local transport current 
expenditure on revenue support and road maintenance lost 
Transport Supplementary Grant Support and became subject to block 
grant support in the same way as other local authority services. 
However, in 1986/87 the broader context of financial controls was 
changed by the ending of the system of expenditure targets and 
grant penalties. In its place the Government introduced a 
modification to the GRP component of the basic block grant 
formula so as to reduce the block grant entitlement of all 
authorities as their expenditure increased, and to increase the 
rate of loss of grant above a threshold level of spending (c. 10% 
above GRE) thus imposing heavier penalties on the larger 
overspenders' relative to GRE (see Sanderson, 1988, Annex 2). 
This means that GREs now play a more direct role in the 
expenditure control system and the implications of this for local 
transport expenditure will be considered in more detail together 
with the implications of the reform of the TSG system in the next 
section. 
During 1986 two major legislative measures took effect which have 
had a considerable impact on local transport expenditure. The 
first measure was the 1985 Local Government Act which abolished 
the GLC and metropolitan counties; the second was the 1985 
Transport Act which deregulated local bus transport. The GLC and 
the metropolitan county councils were abolished at the end of 
March 1986. Responsibility for public transport in the 
provincial metropolitan areas passed to the joint board PTAs 
which are subject to strict expenditure limits and precept 
control by the Secretary of State, while the GLC1s and MCC's 
responsibilities for local roads passed to the London boroughs 
and metropolitan districts respectively. These changes had two 
major implications for local transport expenditure and provision. 
First, the degree of central government control over public 
transport expenditure increased significantly through expenditure 
limits imposed on current expenditure and direct capital 
allocations to the PTAs. Second, expenditure on roads became 
subject to greater 'competition1 from a wider range of services 
in the London boroughs and metropolitan districts in a context 
where current expenditure was no longer supported by TSG, where 
current expenditure restraint was exercised through a revised 
approach to block grant abatement, and where several of the 
authorities concerned were subjected to rate-capping. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that there has been a significant 
reduction in current expenditure on public transport revenue 
support in the metropolitan areas since 1985/86 - down 37.5% in 
real terms to 1987/88 budgets. Figure 3.2 indicates a slight 
overspend by the PTAs against their GREs but nationally budgeted 
expenditure in 1987/88 was below the Government's provision due 
to underspending by the shire counties (Figures 2.3 and 3.2). 
Also relevant to the explanation of this trend is the second 
major development during 1986 - the deregulation in October of 
local bus services. Following deregulation local authorities 
must submit to competitive tendering all services requiring 
support to supplement those provided on a commercial basis. The 
main effects of this measure will be reflected in expenditure 
from 1987/88 onwards but the Department of Transport has 
estimated that some 37% of the total reduction in expenditure on 
public transport support between 1985/86 and 1987/88 (budgets) is 
attributable to bus deregulation, with the remainder due largely 
to the abolition of the metropolitan counties (H M Treasury, 
1988, p 135). This would imply that abolition of the MCCs has 
reduced expenditure on revenue support in metropolitan areas by a 
quarter since 1985/86, while deregulation is responsible for most 
of the 16% reduction in real terms in such expenditure since 
1985/86 in the shire areas. Of course, in the latter areas, in 
particular, the effects of deregulation per se must be assessed 
in the context of the discontinuation of TSG support for revenue 
support expenditure and the requirement for such expenditure to 
,compete* with a range of other services within a system of 
expenditure restraint which reduces block grant as expenditure 
increases. 
As indicated above, capital expenditure on public transport in 
the metropolitan areas is now subject to greater central 
government control through direct capital allocations to the 
PTAs. Following the discontinuation of TSG support for such 
expenditure from 1985/86, capital investment must now be financed 
either from borrowing (with block grant support for debt charges) 
or by specific grants which are available under Section 56 of the 
1968 Transport Act, although only for large infrastructure 
projects. The PTAsn capital allocations also allow for grants to 
operators for public transport investment and such grants to 
British Rail in respect of rolling stock renewal have been an 
important element in public transport capital expenditure since 
1985/86 (especially in 1987/88 when the provision for such grants 
by the PTAs of £55 million constituted 52% of total provision). 
However, the process of rolling stock renewal on BR services in 
the metropolitan areas will be virtually completed in 1988/89 and 
thereafter public transport capital expenditure will cover mainly 
investment in new and improved rail and bus stations, interest in 
the former having increased significantly in recent years, and 
borrowing by any local authority-owned bus companies. 
This latter element has also been affected by the deregulation of 
local bus services so that from the financial year 1986/87 
capital expenditure financed by internally-generated income in 
local authority-owned bus companies (and airports) has been 
excluded from the provision for local authority capital 
expenditure. Only the external financing requirement (EFL) of 
such companies is now included, as is the case with nationalised 
industries, and this includes grants and other income from 
government, borrowing and the capital value of leased assets (H M 
Treasury, 1986, p 130-3). Of the provision for local public 
transport capital expenditure in 1988/89, 31% is in respect of 
borrowing by local authority-owned bus companies, most of the 
remainder covering investment in rail and bus stations and 
interchanges (H M Treasury, 1988, p 135). 
Within the context of the effects of all the above changes we can 
now focus on a more detailed examination of the implications for 
local transport expenditure of the reform of the TSG system which 
resulted in the restriction of TSG support from 1985/86 to 
capital expenditure on roads ,of more than local importancef. 
3.3 The Reform of the TSG Svstem 
3.3.1 Current Emenditure Since 1984/85 
With the ending of TSG support for current expenditure on road 
maintenance and safety and public transport revenue support, the 
full grant-related expenditure assessments were, from 1985/86, 
assigned to local authorities as the basis for the distribution 
of block grant support in respect of these items. Separate GREs 
were devised for road maintenance (including safety), and public 
transport revenue support outside London and new methods were 
developed for assigning the total GREs to individual authorities 
which were intended better to reflect the expenditure needs of 
authorities. Thus, whereas prior to 1985/86 the GRE for 
maintenance and revenue support (net of TSG) had been assigned 
primarily on the basis of population, since 1985/86 the GRE for 
maintenance has been sub-divided into normal and winter 
maintenance and street lighting and allocated on the basis of 
road lengths in different categories modified by traffic usage 
and weather data (Department of Environment, 1985A). Local 
transport current expenditure was thereby incorporated fully into 
the general block grant system (supplemented in 1985/86 by 
expenditure targets and grant penalties) and as a result became 
subject to the broader system of expenditure restraints and 
controls in the same way as other items of local authority 
current expenditure. 
Looking at changes in expenditure relative to provision between 
1984/85 and 1985/86 reference back to Figures 2.1 - 2.3 
illustrates the extent of decline in real terms in current 
expenditure by local authorities and a marked reduction in 
overspending, particularly on revenue support. Of course, much 
of this is due to the loss-of responsibility for public transport 
by the GLC but reference to Figure 3.la shows that there was a 
substantial real terms decline in current expenditure on roads 
and public transport even if expenditure by LRT in 1985/86 is 
included. Figure 3.lb shows the marked reduction in expenditure 
in London. 
Analysing the situation in more detail it is notable that there 
was a reduction in real terms in current expenditure which had 
previously been eligible for TSG which exceeded the reduction in 
'provision1 (see Table 3.1). However, the pattern of change in 
expenditure relative to the change in fprovisionl (as measured by 
expenditure accepted for TSG in 1984/85 and by the new GREs in 
1985/86) varies between programme and between classes of local 
authority as shown in Table 3.1. Thus, revenue support 
expenditure shows the largest decrease but this is consistent 
with the change in provision nationally. (The picture is, of 
course, complicated by the loss of responsibility for public 
transport by the GLC and this is allowed for in the national 
changes shown in Table 3.1.) Table 3.1 indicates a tendency in 
the metropolitan counties to protect revenue support expenditure 
relative to provision and they were probably helped in this by 
the increase in block grant. In the shire areas, however, real 
terms cuts in revenue support were greater than the reduction in 
provision while, on the other hand, road maintenance expenditure 
was reduced in real terms in spite of an increase in provision. 
The significant reduction in block grant for the shire counties 
indicates the degree of expenditure restraint faced by these 
authorities. In the general the change from overspending to 
underspending on road maintenance betwen 1984/85 and 1985/86, 
mainly due to real terms reductions in expenditure, suggests that 
the loss of TSG support may have had an adverse impact on 
authoritiesf ability to sustain expenditure on this item. 
Table 3.1 
Comparison of Changes in Provision, Expenditure 
and Block Grant Between 1984/85 and 1985/86 
(Figures in percentages on real terms prices) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- .----------  
L  A Change i n  ' p r o v i s i o n '  Change i n  e x p e n d i t u r e  Change i n  l 
c l a s s  M a i n t  Rev Supp T o t a l  n a i n t  Rev Supp T o t a l  B l o c k  G r a n t  2  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
London - 9 . 6  - 9 . 6  - 9 . 2  - 9 . 2  - 5 . 0  
n e t s  - 0 . 2  - 1 4 . 1  - 6 . 7  - 0 . 8  - 9 . 5  - 5 . 9  + 9 . 6  
S h i r e s  + 2 . 4  - 2 . 9  + 1 . 6  - 1 . 6  - 1 5 . 8  - 3 . 8  - 6 . 5  
E n g l a n d  + 0 . 2  - 1 0 . 0  - 2 . 2  - 2 . 8  - 1 1 . 1  - 5 . 3  - 6 . 4  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
rotes on Table 3.1 
'Change in provisionf is the change from 1984/85 ,accepted 
expendituresf for maintenance and other current expenditure 
and revenue support to 1985/86 GREs for maintenance and 
revenue support (Source: DTp data and GRE 'Green Book1 
1985/86). 
,Change in block grant1 is calculated from CIPFA estimates 
of block grant entitlement on the basis of budget estimates 
(Source: CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 1984/85 and 
1985/86) . 
Figures for EnglanrL exclude revenue support in London in 
1984/85. 
Trends since 1985/86 in public transport current expenditure by 
local authorities have been influenced heavily both by the 
abolition of the metropolitan counties and by bus deregulation, 
as indicated above. Figures 3.la - 3.ld show the trends in real 
terms in current expenditure on roads and public transport 
nationally and in London, the metropolitan and the shire areas, 
illustrating the significant change in the balance between roads 
and public transport due primarily to the transfer of control 
over public transport in London and the metropolitan areas to LRT 
and the rate-capped J?TAs respectively. Thus, the 1987/88 LRT 
budget represents just over a quarter of the GLC's 1984/85 
expenditure (Figure 3.lb), while in the metropolitan areas the 
WAS' 1987/88 budgets are down by about a quarter from the MCCsr 
1985/86 expenditure. Therefore, whereas in 1984/85 public 
transport revenue support expenditure had comprised 30% of total 
current transport expenditure by English local authorities, by 
1987/88 (budgets) this was down to 14%. As a result the balance 
of expenditure had shifted away from the large urban areas 
towards the shire areas with the latter increasing their 
proportion of total current expenditure from 43% in 1984/85 to 
53% in 1987/88. 
In the shire areas as indicated in the previous section, 
deregulation of local bus transport is likely to have been a 
major factor in reducing revenue support spending between 1985/86 
and 1987/88 budgets by about a quarter (Figure 3.ld). However, 
the impact of bus deregulation per se will have been increased by 
the loss of TSG support for current expenditure because 
expenditure on supported bus services by the shire counties now 
has to compete *on equal terms' against a range of demands from 
other services in a context (since the abolition of targets and 
penalties in 1986/87) where each pound of increased spending 
results in a loss of block grant. Thus, referring to Figure 3.2~ 
it can be seen that in 1987/88 provision (as measured by GRE) was 
reduced by 14.4% for the shire counties reflecting the savings 
from bus deregulation expected by the Government. Nevertheless, 
the 1987/88 budgets of these authorities were still some 19% 
below the GRE suggesting that revenue support expenditure tends 
to 'lose out* somewhat in the competition for resources. 
Nationally, budgeted expenditure on revenue support in 1987/88 
was down to the level of provision as expressed by GREs (Figure 
3.2a) with the spending shortfall from GRE in the shire counties 
counter-balanced by spending over GRE in the metropolitan PTAs. 
Figure 3.2b illustrates clearly the extent to which revenue 
support expenditure in the metropolitan areas has come into line 
with the Government's provision since 1985/86. 
Following the reduction in 1985/86, road maintenance expenditure 
increased in real terms in 1986/87 by 9% nationally (Figures 2.1 
and 3.la). However, the increase was concentrated in the shire 
areas (+ 11%) and the metropolitan areas (+ 9%) with expenditure 
virtually static in real terms in London (Figures 3.lb - 3.ld). 
Moreover, the increase in expenditure nationally did not match 
the increase in provision by the Government resulting in an 
increased underspend (Figure 2.3). 1987/88 budget data indicate 
a significant increase in the degree of underspending (to some 
12%) as expenditure declined in real terms relative to a -further 
increase in provision. 
Therefore, the situation pertaining in 1987/88 in respect of road 
maintenance represents a real terms increase in expenditure since 
1983/84 of only 3% compared with an increase in provision by the 
Government of 21%. This increase in provision, particularly 
since 1985/86, was made as a reflection of 'l... the high priority 
the Government gives to maintaining the local road network ... II 
(H M Treasury, 1986, p 136) and 'l.. . the Government 'S continuing 
commitment to ensuring that roads are kept in a satisfactory 
condition1' (H M Treasury, 1987, p 141). However, local 
authorities clearly have been unable or unwilling to increase 
their expenditure on road maintenance in line with the 
Government's plans and the explanation for this probably lies in 
two main factors. 
On the one hand, although provision for road maintenance in the 
Government's spending plans has been increased substantially, 
local authorities have not been provided, to the same degree, 
with the means to meet that provision in the form of grant 
support for expenditure. Figure 3.3a shows that the increase in 
the road maintenance GRE between 1985/86 and 1987/88 (14.5% in 
real terms) did not match the total increase in provision (20% in 
real terms). Moreover, although the downward real terms trend in 
block grant support was halved in 1986/87 (Figure 2.7) its 
proportionate contribution to total English local authority 
relevant expenditure has continued to decline from 35% in 1985/86 
to 32% in 1987/88. Therefore, the Government's broader system of 
expenditure controls provides a continuing climate of restraint. 
The second factor is the response by local authorities to this 
climate in terms of expenditure levels relative to GREs. Of 
course, all authorities have faced, since the abolition of 
targets and penalties in 1986/87, a block grant distribution 
formula which reduces block grant as expenditure increases, with 
the rate of reduction increased for spending above a 'threshold1, 
which is about 10% above GRE. In such a situation, given the 
incentive to maintain expenditure close to GRE, authorities have 
to balance their priorities with any service expenditures in 
excess of their particular GREs producing pressure to reduce 
expenditure on other services below their GREs. In view of a 
tendency towards continued overspending on such services as 
education, social services, police and fire the trend towards 
increasing underspending on road maintenance would indicate 
difficulties faced by local authorities in allocating additional 
resources to this item in the context of the system of block 
grant abatement supplemented by rate-capping. 
However, the pattern differs between London, metropolitan and 
shire authorities. In London (Figure 3.3b) maintenance 
expenditure exceeds GRE but since 1985/86 the discrepancy has 
been reduced as expenditure has declined in real terms while the 
GRE has increased. This indicates a relative shift of 
expenditure towards other services in the London boroughs several 
of which are subject to rate-capping due to the large excess of 
expenditure over GRE. In the metropolitan areas (Figure 3.3~) 
maintenance expenditure has increased in real terms since 1985/86 
but has nevertheless fallen further below GRE suggesting as 'even 
handed1 approach to resource allocation in the metropolitan 
districts. Similarly, in the shires (Figure 3.3d) expenditure 
has fallen further below GRE since 1985/86 and there was a real 
terms reduction in expenditure in 1987/88 (budgets) suggesting 
increasing difficulties in sustaining priorities for maintenance 
expenditure in the shire counties. 
In the 1988 Public Expenditure White Paper the Government 
acknowledged this It.. increasing tendency for local authorities 
to underspend on maintenance .lo and argued that it indicated 
It... that local authorities are not according road maintenance 
sufficiently high priorityoo (H M Treasury, 1988, p 133). 
Consequently, provision for 1988/89 is held at the same level in 
cash terms as in 1987/88 representing a real terns reduction 
(3.4% on GDP deflator) l#. to set local government a realistic 
target increaseo1 (ibid. p 134). However, the maintenance GRE for 
1988/89 has also been reduced in real terms to 5% below provision 
and since the increase in block grant hardly matches the increase 
in relevant expenditure (Figure 2.7) it remains to be seen 
whether or not authorities can deliver an increase in road 
maintenance expenditure in accordance with the Government's 
wishes. On the face of it the prospects do not appear to be 
promising in view of the continuing constraints on block grant 
and the system of abatement for spending above threshold, and in 
view of the pattern of spending priorities which appears to be 
established in local authorities facing a wide range of 
increasingly pressing needs for their various services. 
3.3.2 Capital Emenditure Since 1984/85 
The trend in public transport capital expenditure since 1984/85 
was discussed in Section 3.2 above so we shall concentrate here 
on roads capital expenditure. As we saw in Section 2.3 above, 
the persistent underspending on roads capital expenditure up to 
1984/85 (relative to overspending on public transport) was 
referred to by the Government in its rationalisation of the 
change in the TSG system and since 1985/86 TSG has been directed 
specifically at promoting the construction of roads by local 
authorities which are important in serving long-distance or 
through traffic and which complement the national system of roads 
for which central government retains responsibility (Department 
of Transport, 1984A) . 
In fact, between 1984/85 and 1986/87 the underspend on roads 
capital was transformed into a small overspend as roads 
expenditure increased in real terms, particularly in 1986/87 
(Figure 2.9). This was the first time that capital expenditure 
on roads had been in excess of the Government's provision since 
the introduction of the new capital control system in 1981/82 and 
it could be interpreted as evidence of some degree of success for 
the new TSG system in promoting investment in larger road 
schemes. This is supported by the significant increase in each 
year since 1984/85 in the number of road schemes costing over £1 
million in progress or started (planned to be started in 1987/88) 
during the year (See Figure 3.4; Department of Transport, 1987, p 
24-5). Moreover, roads capital expenditure showed the highest 
rate of increase between 1984/85 and 1985/86 in London where, as 
we saw in Section 2.3 above, there had been a slight decline in 
real terms between 1982/83 and 1984/85 (Figure 2.11b). Thus, a 
number of extremely large road schemes have been commenced in 
London since the changeln the TSG system including the Hayes 
Bypass (£64 million), Kingston Town Centre Relief Road (£21 
million) and the north-south route in Enfield and Haringey (£73 
million). 
However, the effect of the reformed TSG system in promoting roads 
capital expenditure between 1984/85 and 1986/87 should be 
assessed in the context of the broader capital expenditure 
control system. Indeed, we saw in Section 2.3 the extent to 
which the operation of the system was responsible for 
underspending on roads up to 1984/85 due to the apparent 
inability of authorities to supplement borrowing for roads 
investment with capital receipts on the scale assumed by the 
Government. However, as Figure 2.10 shows, over the period 
1984/85 to 1986/87 capital allocations were set close to 
provision and this must have helped authorities to meet the level 
of provision for roads capital expenditure by 1986/87. 
The importance of the effect of the capital expenditure control 
system is shown even more graphically by the picture in 1987/88. 
According to estimated outturn figures, the trend of increasing 
capital expenditure on local roads was reversed abruptly in 
1987/88 and, relative to a significantly increased provision (+ 
13% in real terms), the forecast underspend is some 24%. 
Clearly, this has interrupted the progress towards the 
achievement of the Government's objective for local road 
investment. This trend can be related to a further change 
introduced by the Government in 1987/88 in the treatment of 
capital receipts in setting the relationship between capital 
expenditure provision and allocations. This change was 
introduced to accommodate the spending power accruing to 
authorities from capital receipts accumulated over the years due 
to the 'cascading' principle applying to the prescribed 
proportions of receipts (see above Section 2.3). By March 1987 
it was estimated that local authorities had accumulated some £8 
billion of capital receipts providing them with a spending power 
during 1987/88 of £2.15 billion compared with £0.6 billion from 
prescribed proportions of in-year receipts (H M Treasury, 1987, p 
359-62). Consequently, from 1987/88 capital allocations were 
reduced for all services to allow for an assumed usage of 
accumulated capital receipts. 
The effect of this change on the relationship between the 
provision for total local transport capital expenditure and the 
sum of authorities1 capital allocations is illustrated in Figure 
2.10. Whereas provision increased by 17% in real terms between 
1986/87 and 1987/88 allocations were reduced by 5% and in 1987/88 
allocations covered only 79% of provision. The situation 
relating specifically to roads capital expenditure is shown in 
Figure 3.5, with allocations in 1987/88 covering 84% of 
provision. The picture for 1988/89 is similar. We saw in 
Section 2.3 above that local authority transport services do not 
generate capital receipts on a very large scale so it is clear 
that the Government is assuming, in introducing this new system, 
that authorities will be able to transfer accumulated receipts 
from other services to local transport spending: 
99Local authorities1 spending power from capital receipts is 
increasing overall and will enable gross capital expenditure 
for all services - including roads - to match gross 
provision providing local government's overall service 
priorities match central government plans.I1 
(H M Treasury, 1988, p 131) 
Since the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties there 
has been some reduction in the mis-match between authorities in 
terms of responsibility for roads capital expenditure and 
spending power from capital receipts. Specifically, the 
situation will have been improved in London and the metropolitan 
areas but in the shire counties the problem remains, since the 
bulk of spending power from capital receipts accrues to the 
district councils. The extent to which the estimated outturn 
roads capital expenditure for 1987/88 falls short of gross 
provision (c. 24%) indicates that the reality does not conform to 
the Government's assumption (although final outturn figures are 
likely to be higher than the estimates). It is clear that 
authorities have not been able (or willing) to apply capital 
receipts to roads expenditure on anything like the scale assumed 
by the Government. It would appear, therefore, that the new 
approach to determining local authorities1 spending power in the 
capital expenditure control system may be jeopardising the 
objective (which lay behind the reform of TSG) of promoting 
investment in major road schemes. 
In fact, the effect of the assumptions about accumulated capital 
receipts in 1987/88 appears to be similar to the effect of the 
assumptions about in-year capital receipts as it was manifested 
in underspending on roads capital over the period up to 1984/85. 
However, the effect is magnified because of the greater degree of 
spending power accruing from accumulated receipts, producing a 
danger of a more serious degree of underspending on roads. 
Comparing Figures 2.9~ and 2.10, it can be seen that the patterns 
of expenditure relative to allocation and provision in 1981/82 
and 1987/88 look very similar, with the effects exaggerated in 
the latter year. With the experience of the early 1980s to refer 
to it must have been to a large degree predictable that the 
changes to the capital control system in 1987/88 would have an 
adverse effect on roads capital expenditure. 
Moreover, it can be expected that this problem will have a 
differential impact on expenditure on road schemes which are 
eligible for TSG on the one hand relative to expenditure on non- 
TSG eligible schems on the other. In particular, major schemes 
costing in excess of £1 million are *named1 in TSG settlements 
and TSG support is contingent upon satisfactory progress being 
made with these schemes. Consequently, it is likely that TSG- 
supported major schemes will have a priority for capital 
allocation within an authority's total roads programme. In 
1986/87 some 35% of local authorities8 total roads capital 
expenditure was on major TSG-supported schemes. 
Figure 3.5 shows that in 1987/88 expenditure accepted for TSG 
comprised a significantly higher proportion of the total roads 
capital allocation than in 1986/87 (69% compared with 61%) and in 
1988/89 this proportion increased to 72%. Therefore, if, on the 
one hand, authorities face difficulties supplementing roads 
capital expenditure from capital receipts and, on the other, TSG- 
eligible schemes gain priority within capital allocations, then 
it can be surmised that non-TSG eligible road programmes. will 
suffer disproportionately from the operation of the capital 
expenditure control system. From the available outturn 
expenditure information it is not possible as yet to test this 
proposition. 
3.4 Discussion 
Our analysis has indicated clearly the extent to which 
developments in central-local government relations since 1984 
have had a marked impact upon local transport expenditure. In 
particular, the problem of overspending on current expenditure on 
public transport in the major conurbations has been eliminated 
and the focus of the Governmentfs concern is now on underspending 
on roads, in terms of both current and capital expenditure. The 
developments since 1984 are symptomatic of a strengthening of the 
Conservative Government's approach to controlling local 
authorities' expenditure in their second term of office following 
the General Election in 1983. We saw in Section 2 that the 
reforms of the general local government expenditure control 
systems introduced in the Governments' first term failed to 
achieve the degree of control over local transport expenditure 
desired by the Government in relation to their spending plans. 
During the period up to 1984 there was a significant disjunction 
between the Governmentfs plans for local transport expenditure 
and local authorities' policies and programmes developed in 
relation to their perceptions of local needs, especially in the 
major conurbations. We concluded (section 2.5) that the main 
factors behind the failure of the Government to achieve 
conformity with their plans were, firstly, the complexity of the 
systems for controlling local authoritiesf expenditure and the 
inability to achieve simultaneously a variety of objectives 
relating to the level of expenditure and its distribution between 
a wide range of services, and, secondly, the importance of the 
discretion left to local authorities within the framework of 
central government controls to determine their own expenditure 
priorities. 
Developments since 1984 have addressed both these factors. On 
the one hand, the Government has introduced measures to attempt 
to refine the general expenditure control systems. The abolition 
of targets and penalties and incorporation of grant abatement 
rules into the general block grant formula; the introduction of 
rate-capping to achieve direct control over authorities whose 
expenditure is deemed to be ,excessive and unreasonablef; the 
incorporation of accumulated capital receipts into the capital 
expenditure control system. These measures are designed to 
improve the Government's ability to keep local authoritiesf 
expenditure in line with central government spending plans. 
On the other hand, the Government has addressed the problem it 
faced due to the exercise of discretion by the local transport 
authorities in the major conurbations. First, responsibility of 
public transport in London was taken away from the GLC to be 
under the direct control of the Secretary of State; then the GLC 
and metropolitan counties were abolished altogether, with public 
transport in the metropolitan areas becoming the responsibility 
of 'joint board1 PTAs whose expenditure is subject to - direct 
control by the Secretary of State. More generally, the 
deregulation of local bus services, together with the ending of 
TSG support for current expenditure and the abolition of the 
upper tier authorities in the major conurbations, have dealt a 
serious blow to the ability of local authorities to devise plans 
for the integrated and co-ordinated development of local 
transport services and facilities in which public transport, in 
particular, can be supported in relation to objectives expressing 
the broader economic and social welfare of local communities. 
This too can be seen as a restriction on the discretion of local 
authorities to develop their expenditure priorities in relation 
to their perceptions of the needs of the people they represent. 
Within this context, the reform of the TSG system can be seen as 
part of a broader move towards increased ascendency of central 
government plans over local discretion and priorities. The new 
TSG is essentially a specific grant to encourage local 
authorities to construct roads, the main purpose of which is to 
serve heavier, longer-distance and through traffic i.e. roads 
which are not primarily designed to meet the needs of the local 
communities which authorities represent and which, therefore, 
local authorities might not otherwise pursue. As such it is a 
very different animal from the original TSG which was a general 
grant to support local authorities' broader transport policies 
and programmes developed in relation to the problems and needs of 
local communities in such a way as to achieve co-ordinated and 
integrated development of all local transport services and 
facilities. 
It is possible to see the measures introduced by the Government 
since 1984, designed to increase their control over local 
authority spending, as effecting significant changes to the 
'rules of the game'. Certainly, the introduction of rate capping 
and the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan councils were 
criticised widely as having 'constitutional1 implications; this 
kind of criticism of measures relating to local government is an 
indication of concern that the 'rules of the game1 are indeed 
being tampered with. In this context the 'rules1 essentially 
express the relationship between central and local government, 
specifically, the degree of autonomy and discretion allowed to 
local authorities to develop their policies and expenditure 
priorities within a wider framework of central government 
economic and social policies and political priorities and within 
the terms of central government financial support for local 
authorities1 expenditure (cf. Sanderson, 1988, Section 2). In 
broad terms, these 'rules' are expressed in the basic systems for 
controlling local authorities1 current and capital expenditure 
which allow authorities the discretion to determine their own 
expenditure priorities within total expenditure levels deemed 
appropriate by the Government. Perhaps the fundamental 
contemporary issue in central-local relations is the extent to 
which central government can encroach upon and circumscribe this 
local discretion before it undermines the traditional status and 
role of local government in our political system. This issue is 
certainly raised by the Government's present proposals for the 
reform of the system of local government finance which will 
replace domestic rates with a per capita community charge and 
will reform the procedures relating to non-domestic rates and 
central government grants-ko local authorities. 
The trends in local transport expenditure since 1984/85 discussed 
in section 3.3, highlight the importance of this issue n the 
context of the present  government,^ approach to the control of 
local government expenditure. Thus, on the one hand, expenditure 
on public transport has been brought into line with the 
Government's spending plans but this is primarily due to the 
assumption of direct Government control over such expenditure in 
the major conurbations. In other words, the Governmentts 
success, in this respect derives from a major reduction in the 
degree and scope of local discretion. On the other hand, local 
authorities8 roads expenditure is signifiaantly out of line with 
the Government's spending plans and a major factor behind this 
problem is, we have argued, the exercise of local discretion of 
authorities in determining their expenditure priorities across a 
range of competing services. 
Indeed, this problem of underspending against the Government's 
plans in respect of both road maintenance current expenditure and 
roads capital expenditure provides further evidence of the 
continuing importance of the interaction between, on the one 
hand, difficulties arising from the operation of the general 
expenditure control systems and, on the other hand, the exercise 
of local discretion within these control systems. We have seen 
(section 3.3.1) that road maintenance expenditure has fallen 
increasingly behind the Government's provision since the ending 
of TSG support and the full incorporation of such expenditure 
into the general block grant system. We have argued that this 
problem derives essentially from the process of determination of 
priorities by local authorities across a range of competing 
services within a context of expenditure restraint exercised by 
the Government through the system of block grant abatement 
supplemented by rate-capping of particular ,high-spending' 
authorities. It would appear to be particularly relevant in 
London and the metropolitan areas where road maintenance has had 
to compete against a wider range of other services since the 
abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties. The effects of 
this process have probably been strengthened by the loss of TSG 
support in respect of such expenditure. 
As regards roads capital expenditure (section 3.3.2) the 
development of an apparently serious underspending in more recent 
years can be attributed to changes in the treatment of 
accumulated capital receipts in the capital expenditure control 
system which provides a context in which the effect of the 
determination of priorities by authorities for the use of 
available receipts across the range of services is strengthened 
because of the greater degree of spending power involved. Within 
this framework there is evidence that the TSG system is 
succeeding in promoting the contruction of roads 'of more than 
local importance' in accordance with the Governmentts policies 
and priorities. 
However, it is apparent that the issue of the effectiveness of 
the TSG system itself is intimately dependent upon the operation 
of the wider capital expenditure control system and that, from 
the point of view of roads capital expenditure, there are 
significant problems in the way that this system handles spending 
power from capital receipts. If the Government persists with the 
present approach to capital expenditure control, particularly in 
respect of accumulated capital receipts, one can foresee a 
potential threat to the credibility of the TSG system. This 
arises from the requirement for local authorities to supplement 
their roads allocations from capital receipts to a significant 
degree and the apparent greater degree of dependence of non-TSG 
eligible roads programmes on the availability of such receipts. 
We have seen that past experience indicates that roads investment 
tends to suffer in such a situation because of the lack of 
sufficient receipts in the authorities with road construction 
responsibilities and/or because of competition from other 
services (e.g. education, social services) for the available 
receipts. If non-TSG eligible roads programmes begin to suffer 
disproportionately there is danger of frustration developing 
amongst local authorities because non-TSG eligible schemes are, 
by definition, directed more at the needs of local communities 
whose interests they represent. This could then result in a 
reduced enthusiasm for TSG eligible schemes, notwithstanding the 
availability of grant, in an attempt to make more progress with 
road schemes which are, specifically, of local importance. It 
remains to be seen whether or not this potential threat to the 
achievement of the objectives of the TSG system materialises in 
the longer term. Much depends, of course, on the Government's 
approach to capital expenditure control and proposals for further 
changes to the system are being considered by the Secretary of 
State for the Environment. 
The picture in respect of roads expenditure, therefore, presents 
an interesting contrast with that in respect of public transport 
and it highlights the importance of the issue of the future role 
and importance of local autonomy and discretion in a context 
where one of the Government's priority objectives is to achieve 
control over local government expenditure in relation to central 
government spending plans. Indeed, the Government's concern 
about underspending on road maintenance has raised the prospect 
of further changes affecting the financing of local transport 
expenditure which could have implications for the scope of local 
authoritiesr discretion. As indicated earlier, the Government's 
present proposals for the reform of the system of local 
government finance embody a radical response by the Government to 
this tension between local autonomy and discretion on the one 
hand and central control on the other, and can be seen as a 
logical extension of this Government's approach, manifested in 
the series of measures introduced since 1980 (and more 
particularly since 1984), involving the progressive 
circumscription of the scope for local authorities to exercise 
discretion in such a way as to produce expenditure consequences 
at odds with the Governmentrs plans. 
4. Summarv and Conclusions 
The present Government has pursued an intensive programme of 
legislative reform over the past eight years or so with the aim 
of achieving greater control over local authorities1 expenditure 
and bringing such expenditure into line with central government 
objectives and spending plans. This report presents the results 
of our analysis of the impacts of this programme upon local 
authorities1 transport expenditure. The next stage in our 
research will comprise an assessment of the implications for 
authorities1 ability to address local transport problems and 
needs and will be the subject of a subsequent report. 
The reforms of the general local government expenditure control 
systems introduced during the Government's first term of office 
(1979-83) failed to achieve the desired degree of control over 
local transport expenditure. During the period up to 1984 there 
was a significant degree of overspending by local authorities, 
particularly on public transport in London and the metropolitan 
areas. This was primarily due to the policies and priorities of 
Labour Councils in these areas, developed in relation to their 
perceptions of local needs in a context of economic recession 
which were at odds with the Governmentls objectives. On the 
other hand, local authorities consistently underspent the 
Government's provision for roads capital expenditure, frustrating 
the Government's developing objectives in relation to the 
promotion of the construction of roads to serve heavy and longer 
distance traffic (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
The main factors behind the Governmentls failure to bring local 
authority spending into line with central spending plans were, 
firstly, the complexity of the systems for controlling local 
authorities1 expenditure and the inability to achieve 
simultaneously a range of objectives relating to both the level 
of expenditure and its distribution between a wide range of 
services and, secondly, the importance of the discretion left to 
local authorities, within the framework of central government 
control mechanisms, to determine their own expenditure priorities 
(section 2.5) . 
The principle of local discretion was built into the arrangement 
for Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) which was, before 
1985/86, a block grant to support authorities1 local transport 
policies and programmes as a whole. The operation of the TSG 
system per se cannot be seen as the main source of the 
Governmentls frustration with local authorities1 spending 
behaviour but it certainly contributed to the broader problem in 
two ways. First, as an unhypothecated grant it supported 
patterns of expenditure arising from the exercise of local 
discretion by authorities in the major conurbations whose 
perceptions of spending needs differed radically from the 
Governmentls plans. Secondly, it added complexity to the system 
for control of local authority expenditure providing local 
authorities with an additional degree of discretion within the 
broader framework of central government control mechanisms 
(section 2.4) . 
As regards this latter asp3ct of the problem, the TSG system can 
indeed be seen as having become something of an anachronism in 
the context of the Government's policies and priorities .during 
the early 1980s. Originally, devised with a view to promoting 
local transport expenditure in the context of co-ordinated and 
integrated plans, it had become rather a hindrance to a 
Government concerned primarily to achieve greater control over 
local authorities' expenditure in terms of both its level and 
distribution between programme areas. The reform of the system, 
restricting TSG support from 1985/86 to capital expenditure on 
roads serving primarily heavy and longer distance traffic, can be 
seen as consistent with the Government's broader approach to 
achieving conformity with central spending plans which embodied a 
shift of resources away from public transport towards roads. 
The emphasis placed by the Government, in their reasoning behind 
the reform of the TSG system, on its role in supporting the 
recalcitrant spending behaviour of certain local authorities can 
be seen as underplaying the role of the broader expenditure 
control systems. In particular, underspending on roads capital 
expenditure was attributable primarily to the priorities 
established by authorities in response to the operation of the 
capital expenditure control system. Specifically, the treatment 
of capital receipts in this sytem disadvantaged authorities in 
shire and metropolitan areas with road construction 
responsibilities (section 2.3). 
The complexity of the control systems developed by the Government 
was an important factor, with local transport expenditure being 
affected by changes designed to achieve broader control 
objectives. Thus, the changes in the treatment of capital 
receipts in the capital expenditure control system was a response 
to serious overspending, particularly on housing and education 
programmes, but exacerbated underspending on roads programmes 
(section 2.3). The system of expenditure targets and penalties 
in respect of current expenditure was aimed particularly at high 
spending authorities in London and the metropolitan areas but had 
a major restraining impact on the shire counties which affected 
their transport expenditure; particularly current expenditure on 
road maintenance but also capital expenditure via debt charges 
(section 2.2.3). 
These contradictory impacts of the general expenditure control 
systems on local transport expenditure were compounded by the 
impact of the 1983 Transport Act which introduced 'Protected 
Expenditure Levels' (PELs) in respect of public transport revenue 
support for the GLC and Metropolitan Counties. Notwithstanding 
the effect of PELs restraining the growth in revenue support 
expenditure, they rather served to confuse the issue of what 
constituted appropriate yardsticks for expenditure relative to 
the Government's spending plans and they had an impact on the 
distribution of TSG resources, particularly in 1983/84, which can 
be seen as rather perverse in terms of the Government's plans and 
objectives (section 2.2.2 and 2.4). 
The problem faced by the Government in their inability to achieve 
a range of (not mutually consistent) objectives with their 
general expenditure control systems therefore compounded their 
difficulties arising from the discretion available to local 
authorities to pursue spending priorities at odds with -central 
government plans. Up to 1984 the Government's difficulties in 
bringing authorities into line with such plans indeed are 
indicative of the strength and importance of local autonomy and 
discretion exercised within the framework of the Government's 
broader control systems. Thus, overspending on public transport 
and underspending on road construction arose from the decision- 
making processes in local authorities on the allocation of 
resources available to them, within the constraints of central 
government controls in response to the wide range of problems and 
needs perceived as requiring attention in their areas (section 
2.5). 
Since 1984, however, the Government has introduced a series of 
radical measures which have addressed specifically the influence 
of local authorities' discretion upon transport expenditure. 
There have also been various modifications and refinements to the 
broader expenditure control mechanisms. These changes have been 
designed to improve the Government's ability to bring local 
authorities' expenditure into line with central spending plans 
(section 3.2) . 
Such changes include the transfer of responsibility for public 
transport in London in 1984 to a nationalised industry, London 
Regional Transport; the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan 
counties in 1986 and the transfer of responsibility for public 
transport in the latter areas to PTAs subject to direct 
expenditure control by the Government; the deregulation of local 
bus transport, also in 1986; and the ending of TSG support for 
transport current expenditure from 1985/86. The net result of 
these measures has been a direct reduction in the role of local 
authorities in decision-making about resource allocation to 
public transport and a restriction on the discretion of local 
authorities to develop integrated and co-ordinated plans for the 
development of local transport services and facilities in 
relation to the perceived needs of the communities they 
represent, in which public transport, in particular, can be 
supported to achieve objectives expressing the broader economic 
and social welfare of those communities (section 3.4). 
These measures, together with the introduction of 'rate-capping', 
changes in the system for block grant 'abatement' for 'high 
spending' authorities, and further changes in the treatment of 
capital receipts in the capital expenditure control system, have 
effected considerable changes in the level and pattern of local 
authorities' transport expenditure since 1984. In particular, 
expenditure on local public transport has been reduced and 
brought into line with the Government's plans directly due to the 
circumscription of local authorities1 control over public 
transport spending in the major conurbations. On the other hand, 
whilst expenditure on roads programmes has increased, 
underspending against the Government's plans for such programmes 
has become a more serious problem. This problem, again, reflects 
the exercise of local authorities' priorities within the 
constraints imposed by the broader expenditure control system 
(section 3.3). 
In the case of road maintenance, since the ending of TSG support 
it has had to compete with other services on an equal footing in 
a context of constrained block grant support and since the 
abolition of the GM: and metropolitan counties it has had to 
compete with a wider range of services in the London boroughs and 
metropolitan districts. Underspending on road maintenance 
derives from the interaction of the tight restraints on local 
authorities1 current expenditure by the Government and the 
determination of expenditure priorities between services by 
authorities within the overall restraints (section 3.3.1). As 
regards roads capital expenditure, changes in the treatment of 
capital receipts have resulted in increased constraints on 
resources for certain highway authorities (particularly the shire 
counties) and the serious underspend again reflects the inability 
of authorities both to generate receipts on a scale assumed by 
the Government and to allocate available receipts to roads 
programmes in competition with other services (section 3.3.2). 
The reform of the TSG system, to provide support from 1985/86 
only for capital expenditure on roads ,of more than local 
importance1, serving heavier and longer distance traffic, can be 
seen as part of the broader pattern of increased ascendancy of 
central government plans over locally-determined policies and 
priorities. TSG is now essentially a specific grant to encourage 
local authorities to construct roads which are not primarily 
designed to meet the needs of local communities within the 
context of an integrated and co-ordinated plan for all local 
transport services and facilities - i.e. roads to which local 
authorities might otherwise assign a relatively low priority. 
This makes it radically different from the original TSG which was 
a general grant for use at authorities1 discretion to support 
their broader transport plans and programmes developed 
specifically in relation to the perceived needs of local 
communities in such a way as to achieve local co-ordination and 
integration. This radical difference in scope and purpose, which 
reflects the change in the Government's philosophy for, and 
approach to, local transport is to some extent masked by the 
retention of the same name for the grant and the 'Transport 
Policies and Programme1 submissions. 
There is some evidence (although it is too early to be 
conclusive) that the new TSG system is succeeding in promoting 
the construction by local authorities of roads of 'more than 
local importance1 and, to date, it would appear that authorities 
are, in general, conforming to the Government's approach and 
bringing forward large numbers of schemes in bids for TSG 
resources. However, there is also some preliminary evidence that 
the operation of the broader capital expenditure control system 
(specifically the treatment of accumulated capital receipts) may 
be imposing more severe constraints on non-TSG eligible schemes 
(i.e. those specifically of more importance to local communities) 
and, in the absence of changes in the treatment of capital 
receipts in this system, this might pose a potential threat to 
authorities1 enthusiasm for, and commitment to, the TSG system 
(section 3.4) . 
In general, then, our analysis highlights the salience of the 
issue of the role and importance of local government autonomy and 
discretion relative to central government control and, indeed, 
raises the fundamental question of the extent to which central 
government can encroach upon and circumscribe this autonomy and 
discretion before it undermines the traditional status and role 
of local government in our political system. Clearly, a healthy 
system of local democracy will produce diversity and will 
generate some tension and conflict between local and central 
government. Central government must be prepared to accept the 
failure of local authorities1 expenditure priorities to match 
central spending plans as a necessary cost of a tradition of 
strong local government exercising discretion in relation to 
perceived local problems and needs. The record of the present 
Government, however, indicates a lack of faith in local 
government and an unwillingness to accept this cost. 
The political and economic framework within which local 
authorities can exercise their own discretion is, therefore, 
being modified radically by the Government and the changes we 
discuss in relation to local transport expenditure (such as the 
reform of the TSG system) can be seen as part of this broader 
programme. We highlight the significance of such measures as 
rate-capping1 and the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan 
counties in this respect and, in general, indicate the importance 
of the broader expenditure control systems. The Government's 
present proposals for the reform of the system of local 
government finance, introducing the ,community charge1, national 
business rate and changes to the grant system, represent a 
further radical response to the tension between local autonomy 
and central control which, together with other measures 
(affecting, for example, education and housing) will erode 
further the scope for local authorities to exercise their 
discretion in such a way as to produce expenditure consequences 
at odds with the Government's plans. 
5. Research Issues 
This report has presented findings from the second stage of our 
research which has involved analysis of data relating to trends 
in local authorities1 transport expenditure relative to the 
provision for such expenditure expressed in the Government's 
spending plans. On the basis of this analysis we have been able 
to draw certain conclusions about the impact of changes in 
central government policies and controls relating to local 
government finance upon local authorities1 transport expenditure. 
The next stage of our research aims to take this analysis further 
by examining information from a sample of local authorities to 
achieve two main objectives. The first is to obtain further 
detailed evidence in relation to the findings and conclusions 
presented in this report, in particular to examine the extent to 
which measures introduced by the Government actually caused 
changes in local authorities ,expenditure. The second objective 
is to take the analysis beyond the effect on local authorities1 
expenditure and to examine the effects on their transport outputs 
and their ability to address the transport problems and needs 
which they face in their areas. 
Certain issues emerge from our research to date which provide a 
focus for the analysis during the next stage. The primary aim, 
of course, will be to provide an assessment of the impact of the 
reform of the TSG system, such an assessment being undertaken in 
the context of the operation of the general systems for control 
of local authorities1 current and capital expenditure, in the 
sense that it must refer both to the impact on roads capital 
expenditure and to the implications for expenditure which lost 
TSG support in 1985/86 and now receive grant support from other 
sources. Within this framework we can identify the following 
issues for the next phase of our research. 
1. We will examine the impact during the period up to 1984/85 
(and particularly from 1982/83 onwards) upon local 
authorities1 ability to address perceived local transport 
problems and needs of: 
a) Restraints on block grant and the operation of 
expenditure targets and penalties, particularly in 
relation to public transport revenue support and road 
maintenance; 
b) The operation of the capital expenditure control 
system, particularly in respect of the availability and 
application of capital receipts, with reference to road 
construction and improvement; 
c) Changes in the level of resources provided through TSG 
settlements in relation to the effects of the broader 
controls on current and capital expenditure. 
In the light of the availability of information from local 
authorities and the timescale of our research, the above 
analysis will be undertaken primarily in relation to a 
sample of shire counties. 
.-. 
2. For the period from 1985/86 to the present we will focus on 
assessment of the impact of the reform of the TSG system on 
selected local authorities1 transport expenditure and 
provision against the background of the pre-1985/86 analysis 
(cf. 1 above), and, again, in the context of the broader 
expenditure controls systems, and other major changes 
affecting the provision of local transport services. Our 
analysis will focus on two main questions: 
a) How has the ability of local authorities to meet 
current expenditure needs fared since the ending of TSG 
support and the full integration of such expenditure 
into the general block grant system? In relation to 
this question we will examine the impact on road 
maintenance in the shire counties and metropolitan 
districts and on revenue support in the shire counties 
(bearing in mind the impact of deregulation). 
(b) What has been the impact of the reform of the TSG 
system, in the context of the broader capital 
expenditure control system, on the ability of local 
authorities to meet needs for road construction and 
improvement in their areas? Here, we will wish to 
address certain specific issues: 
i) The effectiveness of the TSG system in the 
context of the general capital control system 
in promoting the construction by local 
authorities of roads of more than local 
importance; 
ii) The impact on authorities ability to pursue 
road capital programmes which address the 
problems and needs of their areas. There are 
two components to this issue: firstly, the 
extent to which roads of more than local 
importance serve the needs of local 
communities; and, secondly, the extent to 
which authorities have been able to progress 
non-TSG eligible road schemes; 
iii) The impact of the Governmentrs approach to 
the treatment of capital receipts in the 
capital expenditure control system. 
The analysis of these issues will be undertaken on the 
basis of information from both shire counties and 
metropolitan districts. 
Annex : Real Terms Price Indices 
1. GDP Deflator at Market Prices 
a. Conversion from financial vear to financial vear 
Financial Index Conversion Factors to Real Terms Prices 
Year (1986/87 = 100) 1979/80 1981/82 
Note l: Indices for 1987/88 and 1988/89 are forecasts. 
Source: H M Treasury 1988, Volume 1, Tables 5.2, p 91. 
b. Conversion from November ~rices to financial vear 
Fourth Quarter Index Conversion Factor to 
of Year 1979/80 
Source: Economic Trends, Annual Supplement 1987 and December 
1987 issue, Central Statistical Office, HMSO. 
2. Road Maintenance and Liuhtinu Price Indices 
November Maintenance 
of Index Conversion Factor 
Year (Nov 1975 Nov 1979 prices 
= 100) 
Maintenance and Lighting 
Index Conversion Factor 
(Nov 1975 Nov 1979 prices 
= 100) 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 1976-1986, HMSO, 
1987 Table 1.21 and Department of Transport 
Notes on Fiaures 
General : 
1. Deflation of expenditure data to constant prices has been 
effected using the indices set out in the Annex to this 
report. For most data, the GDP market price deflator is 
used but for roads current expenditure the maintenance and 
lighting price index is applied. 
2. The term lprovision' is used to refer to the expenditure 
provided for by the Government in their spending plans as 
set out in the annual Public Expenditure White Paper. Where 
there are exceptions to this general rule they are 
highlighted in the notes to individual figures. 
3. All data relates to local authorities in England. 
Fisures 2.1 - 2.3: 
1. IConc Fares' - expenditure on concessionary fares on 
public transport 
'Pub Trans* - revenue support expenditure on public 
transport including bus, underground, 
ferry and rail services 
IAdmin' - professional and technical services 
Roads - maintenance, lighting and road safety 
2. Source is the annual Public Expenditure White Paper (H.M. 
Treasury 1979-1988). 
1. 'Shire CCsl = Shire County Councils 
'MCCsl = Metropolitan County Councils 
'GLC' = Greater London Council 
2. Source is CIPFA Highway and Transportation Statistics 
1979/80 - 1984/85 and data provided by the Department of 
Transport. 
Fiaure 2.5 
1. See note 1, Figure 2.4. 
2. 'Provision' = expenditure provided for by the 
Government in the annual Public 
Expenditure White Paper 
'Accepted Expend' = expenditure accepted by the Government 
for Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) 
support 
'TPP Bid1 = sum of local authorities bid 
expenditures for TSG submitted in annual 
TPPs 
'PEL1 = Protected Expenditure Levels specified 
by the Secretary of State for the 
metropolitan areas under the terms of 
the. 1983 Transport Act 
3. Source: cf. Figure 2.4 and H.M. Treasury (1979-1984). 
Fiqure 2.6 
1. See notes 1 and 2, Figure 2.5. 
2. Source: cf. Figure 2.5. 
Fiaure 2.7 
1. 'Spec. Grantsv = Specific and supplementary grants (e.g. 
Police grant, TSG) 
'AEG' - Aggregate Exchequer Grant 
'Re1 Expend' - Relevant expenditure (this is defined in 
detail in the annual Rate Support Grant 
Report (England) (cf. Department of 
Environment 1987) 
2. Source: annual Rate Support Grant Reports (Department of 
the Environment 1980-1987). 
Fiaure 2.8 
1. This figure expresses expenditure targets specified by the 
Government as a percentage of total Grant-Related 
Expenditure by class of local authority. 
2. See note 1, Figure 2.5. 
3. Source: CIPFA Finance and General Statistics 1982/83 - 
1985/86 and data provided by the Department of the 
Environment. 
Fiaure 2.9 
1. Other - expenditure on ports, airports and urban - 
programme 
LRT ' - investment expenditure (including 
renewals) by London Regional Transport 
'Pub Trans1 - expenditure on public transport by local 
authorities only including grants to 
British Rail for rolling stock renewal 
in the metropolitan areas and, from 
1986/87, excluding internally generated 
capital financing by bus undertakings 
- construction and improvement of local 
authority roads; includes car parking in 
1981/82, 1982/83 and 1987/88. 
Roads 
2. Source: annual Public Expenditure White Paper (H.M. 
Treasury 1981-1988). 
1. Expenditure is in cash terms (outturn prices). 
2. lAllocation' - Sum of capital allocations in respect of 
the total transport block for English 
local authorities 
'Provision' - gross expenditure provision (i.e. the 
'cash limit') for English local 
authorities for all transport capital 
spending. 
3. source: annual Public Expenditure White Paper (H.M. 
Treasury 1981-1988) and data on capital allocations provided 
by the Department of the Environment. 
Fiaure 2.11 
1. 'LRT1 - investment expenditure (including - 
renewals) by London Regional Transport 
'Pub Transl - expenditure on local authorities' rate 
fund capital accounts on public 
transport 
'Roads/Other I = expenditure on local authorities1 rate 
fund capital accounts on road 
construction and improvement, car 
parking, public lighting and road safety 
2. Source: Local Government Financial Statistics 1979/80 - 
1985/86, (H.M.S.O.), and H.M. Treasury (1987). 
Fisure 2.12 
1. See note 2, Figure 2.5. 
2. Source: Data supplied by the Department of Transport. 
Fiaure 2 .l3 
1. This figure compares local authority classes in terms of the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the proportion of the 
total of capital expenditure taken up by transport and, on 
the other hand, the proportion of total capital expenditure 
financed from capital receipts (e.g. income from disposal of 
land and assets). 
2. GLC = Greater London Council 
MCC = Metropolitan County Councils 
SCC = Shire County Councils 
LBC = London Borough Councils 
MDC = Metropolitan District Councils 
SDC = Shire District Councils 
3. Source: CIPFA Capital Expenditure and Debt Financing 
Statistics 1981/82 - 1985/86. 
Fiaure 2.14 
1. See note 2, Figure 2.5. 
2. Source: Data supplied by the Department of Transport. 
Fiaure 2.15 
1. This figure compares, for English local authorities as a 
whole and for LA classes, the proportion of TSG applied to 
revenue expenditure with the proportion of accepted 
expenditure accounted for by revenue items. 
2. Source: Data provided by Department of Transport and CIPFA 
Finance and General Statistics 1979/80 - 1984/85. 
1. 'Conc Fares1 = expenditure on concessionary fares 
on public transport 
'LRT' - expenditure by London Regional 
Transport on revenue support 
'Rev Supp = expenditure by local authorities and 
PTAs on public transport revenue support 
including bus, ferry and rail 
'Roads - expenditure on road maintenance, 
lighting and safety. 
2. Source: Data supplied by Department of Transport. 
Fiaure 3.2 
1. 'Provision' refers in this figures to the following: 
a) 1983/84 and 1984/85 expenditure accepted for TSG 
support 
b) 1985/86 to 1987/88 grant-related expenditures for 
current expenditure on passenger transport 
2. Source: Data supplied by Department of Transport; 
Department of Environment Grant-Related Expenditure 'Green 
Books1 1985/86 - 1987/88. 
Ficrure 3.3 
1. 'Provision' is defined in the same way as in Figure 3.2, the 
relevant GRE being the sum of normal and winter maintenance 
and street lighting. 
'PEWP1 refers here to the expenditure provided for by the 
Government in the annual Public Expenditure White Paper. 
2. Source: cf Figure 3.2; H.M. Treasury (1983-1987). 
Fiaure 3.4 
1. This figure presents data on local authorities' actual and 
planned performance on major road schemes. 
.*. . 
2. Source: Department of Transport (1987, Figure 12, p. 25). 
Fiaure 3.5 
1. This figure presents data relating to capital expenditure on 
road construction and improvement in cash terms (outturn and 
forecast outturn prices). 
- 2. 'Accepted Expend - capital expenditure on roads 'of 
more than local importancef 
accepted for TSG support 
'Allocation' - capital allocations for all roads 
capital expenditure including both 
TSG eligible and non TSG eligible 
schemes 
fProvisiona - gross provision by the Government 
. for expenditure on roads 
3. Source: Data supplied by Department of Transport and H.M. 
Treasury (1985 - 1988). 
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